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A Competitive Approach to Leadership in Public Good Games

  • Centorrino, Samuele
  • Concina, Laura
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    We show that introducing a competitive preliminary stage in a sequential public good game helps select one of the more cooperative leaders in the group. Using a modified second price auction, we find that bids have a strong positive predictive power on individual contributions. Moreover, evidence is provided that trust can explain voluntary and cooperative leadership. However, followers reaction to voluntary leaders may rise free riding behaviour, with uncertain effect on total public good provision.

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    File URL: http://www.tse-fr.eu/images/doc/wp/env/wp_tse_383.pdf
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    Paper provided by Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) in its series TSE Working Papers with number 13-383.

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    Date of creation: Feb 2013
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    Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:26933
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    Web page: http://www.tse-fr.eu/

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