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An Economic Theory of Leadership Turnover

Author

Listed:
  • Maria Gallego
  • Carolyn Pitchik

Abstract

In an infinite horizon model, a leader of a group of citizens exerts effort in each period to maintain a public good that enhances the profits of a group of kingmakers. In each period, the kingmakers decide whether to overthrow the leader so as to have a chance of becoming the leader. Consistent with the empirical literature, we find that (1) leadership turnover occurs when the kingmakers\\' expected earnings are low; (2) leadership turnover declines with duration in office; (3) leadership turnover declines as the technology for providing the public good improves; (4) leadership turnover increases as the number of kingmakers increases.

Suggested Citation

  • Maria Gallego & Carolyn Pitchik, 1999. "An Economic Theory of Leadership Turnover," Working Papers pitchik-99-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:pitchik-99-01
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    2. Alexandra Brausmann & Elise Grieg, 2020. "Resource Discoveries and the Political Survival of Dictators," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 20/345, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    3. Joel Guttman & Rafael Reuveny, 2014. "On revolt and endogenous economic policy in autocratic regimes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 27-52, April.
    4. Sijeong Lim & Victor Menaldo & Aseem Prakash, 2015. "Foreign aid, economic globalization, and pollution," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 48(2), pages 181-205, June.
    5. Andersen, Jørgen Juel & Aslaksen, Silje, 2013. "Oil and political survival," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 89-106.
    6. Guriev, Sergei & Sonin, Konstantin, 2009. "Dictators and oligarchs: A dynamic theory of contested property rights," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 1-13, February.
    7. Burke Paul J., 2012. "Economic Growth and Political Survival," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-43, March.
    8. Paul Maarek & Michael T. Dorsch, 2015. "Rent seeking, revolutionary threat and coups in non-democracies," Thema Working Papers 2015-13, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS.
    9. He, Qingsong & Xu, Min & Xu, Zike & Ye, Yanmei & Shu, Xianfan & Xie, Peng & Wu, Jiayu, 2019. "Promotion incentives, infrastructure construction, and industrial landscapes in China," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    10. Mulligan, Casey B. & Tsui, Kevin K., 2015. "Political entry, public policies, and the economy," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 377-397.
    11. Norman Schofield & Maria Gallego & Ugur Ozdemir & Alexei Zakharov, 2011. "Competition for popular support: a valence model of elections in Turkey," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(3), pages 451-482, April.
    12. Sonin, Konstantin & Egorov, Georgy, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession," CEPR Discussion Papers 5092, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Georgy Egorov & Sergei Guriev & Konstantin Sonin, 2006. "Media Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives, and the Resource Curse," CEDI Discussion Paper Series 06-10, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University.
    14. Jesus Crespo Cuaresma & Harald Oberhofer & Paul Raschky, 2011. "Oil and the duration of dictatorships," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 505-530, September.
    15. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Politics of Succession," Game Theory and Information 0505003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Konstantin Sonin & Georgy Egorov, 2011. "Incumbency Advantage in Nondemocratic Elections," 2011 Meeting Papers 417, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    17. Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2015. "Regime spoiler or regime pawn: The military and distributional conflict in non-democracies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 491-502.
    18. Curtis Bell & Jun Koga Sudduth, 2017. "The Causes and Outcomes of Coup during Civil War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 61(7), pages 1432-1455, August.
    19. David F Damore & Michelle Kuenzi, 2019. "Executive turnovers in sub-Saharan Africa," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 22(1), pages 21-40, March.
    20. Dorsch, Michael T. & Maarek, Paul, 2018. "Rent extraction, revolutionary threat, and coups in non-democracies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 1082-1103.
    21. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2011. "Dictators And Their Viziers: Endogenizing The Loyalty–Competence Trade‐Off," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(5), pages 903-930, October.
    22. Vincenzo Bove & Jennifer Brauner, 2016. "The demand for military expenditure in authoritarian regimes," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(5), pages 609-625, September.
    23. Brausmann, Alexandra & Grieg, Elise, 2024. "Resource discoveries and the political survival of dictators," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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