An economic theory of leadership turnover
In an infinite horizon model, a leader of a group of citizens exerts effort in each period to maintain a public good that enhances the profits of a group of kingmakers. In each period, the kingmakers decide whether to overthrow the leader so as to have a chance of becoming the leader. Consistent with the empirical literature, we find that (1) leadership turnover occurs when the kingmakers\\' expected earnings are low; (2) leadership turnover declines with duration in office; (3) leadership turnover declines as the technology for providing the public good improves; (4) leadership turnover increases as the number of kingmakers increases.
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