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A conflict-free arbitration scheme in a large population

  • Hannu Vartiainen


    (Department of Economics, Turku School of Economics)

This paper studies allocations that can be implemented by an arbitrator subject to the constraint that the agents' outside option is to start bargaining by themselves. As the population becomes large, the set of implementable allocations shrinks to a singleton point - the conflict-free allocation. Finally, the conflict-free allocation can be implemented via a simple "lobbying" game where parties composed of agents with similar preferences bid for the right to be the first proposer in a bargaining game among the parties, i.e. in the "political game".

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Paper provided by Aboa Centre for Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 34.

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Length: 19
Date of creation: Jun 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp34
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  1. Fishburn, Peter C & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Time Preference," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 23(3), pages 677-94, October.
  2. Kultti, Klaus & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2008. "Bargaining with many players: A limit result," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 101(3), pages 249-252, December.
  3. Kultti Klaus & Vartiainen Hannu, 2007. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Set Bridges Time-Preferences to the Nash Solution," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-26, November.
  4. Krishna, Vijay & Serrano, Roberto, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80, January.
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