Bargaining with Many Players: A Limit Result
We provide a simple characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of an alternating offers bargaining game when the number of players increases without a limit. Core convergence literature is emulated by increasing the number of players by replication. The limit allocation is interpreted in terms of Walrasian market for being the first proposer.
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- Kultti Klaus & Vartiainen Hannu, 2007. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Set Bridges Time-Preferences to the Nash Solution," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-26, November.
- Vijay Krishna & Roberto Serrano, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80.
- Joseph M. Ostroy & Louis Makowski, 2001. "Perfect Competition and the Creativity of the Market," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 479-535, June.
- Fishburn, Peter C & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Time Preference," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 23(3), pages 677-94, October.
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