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The Political Economy of Commitment to Policies

Author

Listed:
  • Josse Delfgaauw

    (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

  • Otto H. Swank

    (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

Abstract

IPCC (2022) documents a looming gap between climate goals and implemented policies and points to a lack of political commitment. We study policymakers' incentives to commit. A policymaker decides on a policy to encourage citizens to make investments and determines the degree of flexibility to change the policy after investments have been made. This adds redistributive concerns to the trade-off between commitment and flexibility. When a majority of citizens invest, redistributive concerns alleviate the time-inconsistency problem. When a minority of citizens invest, redistributive concerns aggravate the time-inconsistency problem. Then, the policymaker either commits too strongly or refrains from commitment altogether.

Suggested Citation

  • Josse Delfgaauw & Otto H. Swank, 2023. "The Political Economy of Commitment to Policies," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 23-060/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20230060
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects

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