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A Simple Model of Self-Assessments

Author

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  • Silvia Dominguez Martinez

    (Faculty of Economics & Business, University of Amsterdam)

  • Otto H. Swank

    (Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)

Abstract

We develop a simple model that describes individuals’ self-assessments oftheir abilities. We assume that individuals learn about their abilities from appraisalsof others and experience. Our model predicts that if communicationis imperfect, then (i) appraisals of others tend to be too positive, and (ii) overconfidenceleading to too much activism is more likely than underconfidenceleading to too much passivity. The predictions of our model are consistentwith findings in the social psychological literature. This discussion paper has led to a publication in the ' Economic Journal ' 119(539), 1225-41.

Suggested Citation

  • Silvia Dominguez Martinez & Otto H. Swank, 2006. "A Simple Model of Self-Assessments," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-010/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20060010
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite, 2004. "Confidence-Enhanced Performance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1536-1557, December.
    2. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2005. "Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation," International Economic Association Series, in: Bina Agarwal & Alessandro Vercelli (ed.), Psychology, Rationality and Economic Behaviour, chapter 2, pages 19-57, Palgrave Macmillan.
    3. Fang, Hanming & Moscarini, Giuseppe, 2005. "Morale hazard," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(4), pages 749-777, May.
    4. Klar, Yechiel & Medding, Aviva & Sarel, Dan, 1996. "Nonunique Invulnerability: Singular versus Distributional Probabilities and Unrealistic Optimism in Comparative Risk Judgments," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 229-245, August.
    5. Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 2005. "Modes of Communication," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(6), pages 1217-1238, December.
    6. Eric Van den Steen, 2004. "Rational Overoptimism (and Other Biases)," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1141-1151, September.
    7. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(3), pages 489-520.
    8. Hvide, Hans K., 2002. "Pragmatic beliefs and overconfidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 15-28, May.
    9. Carrillo, Juan & Brocas, Isabelle, 2002. "Are We All Better Drivers than Average? Self-Perception and Biased Behaviour," CEPR Discussion Papers 3603, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Marco Percoco & Michele Giove, 2009. "Multilevel Governance at Work: Evidence from Structural Funds Management in Lombardia, Italy," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 27(3), pages 381-398, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    self-assessments; learning about ability; coaching; overconfidence; underconfidence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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