Confidence and competence in communication
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-014-9416-5
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Dilmé, Francesc, 2022.
"Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 1-19.
- Francesc Dilmé, 2022. "Strategic Communication with a Small Conflict of Interest," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 148, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
- Francesc Dilmé, 2022. "Strategic Communication With a Small Conflict of Interest," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2022_344, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Szalay, Dezső & Deimen, Inga, 2015.
"Information, authority, and smooth communication in organizations,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
10969, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Szalay, Dezsö & Deimen, Inga, 2016. "Information, Authority, And Smooth Communication In Organizations," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145668, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Nemanja Antić & Nicola Persico, 2020. "Cheap Talk With Endogenous Conflict of Interest," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(6), pages 2663-2695, November.
- Lee, Yong-Ju & Lim, Wooyoung & Zhao, Chen, 2023. "Cheap talk with prior-biased inferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 254-280.
- Michele Dell’Era, 2018. "Financial Transaction Taxes and Expert Advice," Working and Discussion Papers WP 4/2018, Research Department, National Bank of Slovakia.
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More about this item
Keywords
Overconfidence; Underconfidence; Communication apprehension; Cheap talk; D03; D83;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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