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Should economists listen to educational psychologists? Some economics of student motivation

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Abstract

This paper sheds light on the role of student motivation in the success of schooling. We develop a model in which a teacher engages in the management of student motivation through the choice of the classroom environment. We show that the teacher is able to motivate high-ability students, at least in the short run, by designing a competitive environment. For students with low ability, risk aversion, or when engaged in a long term relationship, the teacher designs a classroom environment that is more focused on mastery and self-referenced standards. In doing so, the teacher helps to develop the intrinsic motivation of students and their capacity to overcome failures.

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  • Jocelyn Donze & Trude Gunnes, 2011. "Should economists listen to educational psychologists? Some economics of student motivation," Discussion Papers 662, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    • Handle: RePEc:ssb:dispap:662
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    1. De Fraja, Gianni & Landeras, Pedro, 2006. "Could do better: The effectiveness of incentives and competition in schools," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 189-213, January.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Education; Student Achievement; Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation; Effort; Goal Theory.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education

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