Should economists listen to educational psychologists? Some economics of student motivation
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Other versions of this item:
- Jocelyn Donze & Trude Gunnes, 2011. "Should Economists Listen to Educational Psychologists? Some Economics of Student Motivation," Working Paper Series 12211, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
- Donze, Jocelyn & Gunnes, Trude, 2011. "Should Economists Listen to Educational Psychologists? Some Economics of Student Motivation," TSE Working Papers 11-247, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Donze, Jocelyn & Gunnes, Trude, 2011. "Should Economists Listen to Educational Psychologists? : Some Economics of Student Motivation," MPRA Paper 31059, University Library of Munich, Germany.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsEducation; Student Achievement; Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation; Effort; Goal Theory.;
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-09-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2011-09-16 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EDU-2011-09-16 (Education)
- NEP-LAB-2011-09-16 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-PKE-2011-09-16 (Post Keynesian Economics)
- NEP-URE-2011-09-16 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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