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Discrimination par le marché entre les dettes des États membres de l'UEM

Author

Listed:
  • Anne Frémont
  • Jacques Mélitz

    (School of Management & Languages)

  • Frédéric Zumer

    (Laboratoire de recherche en sciences de gestion Panthéon-Assas)

Abstract

Que deviendront les « spreads1 » de taux d'intérêt qui prévalaient encore récemment entre les dettes des différents États souverains de l'Union économique et monétaire? Ces spreads, bien sur, ne résulteront plus des primes de taux de change. Néanmoins, ils pourraient clairement persister. Ils proviendraient alors pour une part des différences de liquidité relativement aux émissions d'un emprunteur de référence, sûrement le « Bund » allemand ou le Trésor public français, ou une combinaison des deux (peut-être aussi avec le gouvernement néerlandais). Mais, de toute évidence, les spreads pourraient également persister en raison du risque de défaut. Dès lors, quelle sera l'ampleur de ces différentiels et jusqu'où pourraient-ils augmenter en fonction du risque ? Telle est l'une des questions importantes que se posent actuellement les économistes qui étudient l'UEM, en raison notamment de son lien étroit avec les préoccupations sous-jacentes au traité de Maastricht : dérapage possible des dettes publiques, risques de monétisation, refus proclamé du « bail-out » (renflouement).

Suggested Citation

  • Anne Frémont & Jacques Mélitz & Frédéric Zumer, 2000. "Discrimination par le marché entre les dettes des États membres de l'UEM," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/763, Sciences Po.
  • Handle: RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/763
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Favero, Carlo A & Giavazzi, Francesco & Spaventa, Luigi, 1997. "High Yields: The Spread on German Interest Rates," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 956-985, July.
    2. Angeloni, I. & Violi, R., 1997. "Long-Term Interest Rate Convergence in Europe and the Probability of EMU," Papers 322, Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi.
    3. Eichengreen, Barry & Portes, Richard, 1986. "The Anatomy of Financial Crises," CEPR Discussion Papers 130, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Jan J.G. Lemmen & Charles A.E. Goodhart, 1999. "Credit Risks and European Government Bond Markets: A Panel Data Econometric Analysis," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 25(1), pages 77-107, Winter.
    5. Bayoumi, Tamim & Goldstein, Morris & Woglom, Geoffrey, 1995. "Do Credit Markets Discipline Sovereign Borrowers? Evidence from the U.S. States," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(4), pages 1046-1059, November.
    6. Robert N. McCauley & William R. White, 1997. "The Euro and European financial markets," BIS Working Papers 41, Bank for International Settlements.
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    Cited by:

    1. Frédéric Zumer & Jacques Mélitz, 2002. "Partage du risque dans l'Union européenne. Expériences interrégionales et internationales," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(5), pages 299-323.
    2. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/762 is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    UEM; Dette;

    JEL classification:

    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration

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