Corporate Fraud, Governance and Auditing
We analyze corporate fraud in a model where managers have superior information but, due to private benefits from empire building, are biased against liquidation. This may induce them to misreport information and even bribe auditors when liquidation would be value-increasing. To restrain fraud, shareholders optimally choose auditing quality and the performance sensitivity of managerial pay, taking into account external corporate governance and auditing regulation. For given managerial pay, it is optimal to rely on auditing when external governance is in an intermediate range. When both auditing and managerial incentive pay are used, worse external governance must be balanced by heavier reliance on both of these incentive mechanisms. In designing managerial pay, equity can improve managerial incentives while options worsen them.
|Date of creation:||01 Sep 2008|
|Date of revision:||26 Apr 2012|
|Publication status:||Published in the Review of Corporate Finance Studies, 2012, 1(1), pp. 109-133.|
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