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Internal corporate governance, CEO turnover, and earnings management

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  • Hazarika, Sonali
  • Karpoff, Jonathan M.
  • Nahata, Rajarishi

Abstract

The likelihood and speed of forced CEO turnover – but not voluntary turnover – are positively related to a firm's earnings management. These patterns persist in tests that consider the effects of earnings restatements, regulatory enforcement actions, and the possible endogeneity of CEO turnover and earnings management. The relation between earnings management and forced turnover occurs both in firms with good and bad performance, and when the accruals work to inflate or deflate reported earnings. These results indicate that boards tend to act proactively to discipline managers who manage earnings aggressively, before the manipulations lead to costly external consequences.

Suggested Citation

  • Hazarika, Sonali & Karpoff, Jonathan M. & Nahata, Rajarishi, 2012. "Internal corporate governance, CEO turnover, and earnings management," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 44-69.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:104:y:2012:i:1:p:44-69 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.10.011
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    Cited by:

    1. Hornstein, Abigail S., 2013. "Corporate capital budgeting and CEO turnover," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(C), pages 41-58.
    2. Jong-Seo Choi & Young-Min Kwak & Chongwoo Choe, 2014. "Earnings Management Surrounding CEO Turnover: Evidence from Korea," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 50(1), pages 25-55, March.
    3. Zhu, Tingting & Lu, Meiting & Shan, Yaowen & Zhang, Yuanlong, 2015. "Accrual-based and real activity earnings management at the back door: Evidence from Chinese reverse mergers," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 35(PA), pages 317-339.
    4. repec:eco:journ1:2017-02-78 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Dai, Lili & Fu, Renhui & Kang, Jun-Koo & Lee, Inmoo, 2016. "Corporate governance and the profitability of insider trading," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 235-253.
    6. repec:bbz:fcpbbr:v:10:y:2013:i:4:p:110-132 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Bornemann, Sven & Kick, Thomas & Pfingsten, Andreas & Schertler, Andrea, 2015. "Earnings baths by CEOs during turnovers: empirical evidence from German savings banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 188-201.
    8. Tang, Hui-wen & Chen, Anlin & Chang, Chong-Chuo, 2013. "Insider trading, accrual abuse, and corporate governance in emerging markets — Evidence from Taiwan," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 132-155.
    9. Beneish, Messod D. & Marshall, Cassandra D. & Yang, Jun, 2017. "Explaining CEO retention in misreporting firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(3), pages 512-535.
    10. Balachandran, Balasingham & Faff, Robert, 2015. "Corporate governance, firm value and risk: Past, present, and future," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 35(PA), pages 1-12.
    11. Bing Guo & David Pérez-Castrillo & Anna Toldrà -Simats, 2017. "Firms' Innovation Strategy under the Shadow of Analyst Coverage," CESifo Working Paper Series 6574, CESifo Group Munich.
    12. repec:eee:jaecon:v:64:y:2017:i:1:p:37-55 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Masulis, Ronald W. & Mobbs, Shawn, 2014. "Independent director incentives: Where do talented directors spend their limited time and energy?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 406-429.
    14. Liu, Xiaoding, 2016. "Corruption culture and corporate misconduct," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 307-327.
    15. repec:wsi:qjfxxx:v:07:y:2017:i:01:n:s2010139216500142 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Fatima Abdul Hamid & Chaabane Oussama Houssem Eddine & Abdullah Mohamed Ayedh & Abdelghani Echchabi, 2014. "Firms' Financial And Corporate Governance Characteristics Association With Earning Management Practices: A Meta-Analysis Approach," Economic Review: Journal of Economics and Business, University of Tuzla, Faculty of Economics, vol. 12(2), pages 49-72.
    17. Jiang, Fuxiu & Zhu, Bing & Huang, Jicheng, 2013. "CEO's financial experience and earnings management," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 134-145.
    18. Pelucio-Grecco, Marta Cristina & Geron, Cecília Moraes Santostaso & Grecco, Gerson Begas & Lima, João Paulo Cavalcante, 2014. "The effect of IFRS on earnings management in Brazilian non-financial public companies," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 42-66.
    19. repec:eee:corfin:v:45:y:2017:i:c:p:220-244 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. He, Qing & Huang, Jiyuan & Li, Dongxu & Lu, Liping, 2016. "Banks as corporate monitors: Evidence from CEO turnovers in China," BOFIT Discussion Papers 19/2016, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    21. John M. Barrios & Marco Fasan & Daniele Macciocchi, 2013. "CEO turnover, earnings management and value relevance. A theoretical analysis on the Italian context," Working Papers 11, Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia.
    22. Kuo, Jing-Ming & Ning, Lutao & Song, Xiaoqi, 2014. "The Real and Accrual-based Earnings Management Behaviors: Evidence from the Split Share Structure Reform in China," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 101-136.
    23. Ali, Ashiq & Zhang, Weining, 2015. "CEO tenure and earnings management," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 60-79.
    24. Chen, Tao & Xie, Lingmin & Zhang, Yuanyuan, 2017. "How does analysts' forecast quality relate to corporate investment efficiency?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 217-240.
    25. Fu, Renhui & Gao, Fang & Kim, Yong H. & Qiu, Buhui, 2017. "Performance volatility, information availability, and disclosure reforms," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 35-52.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Management turnover; Earnings management; Corporate governance;

    JEL classification:

    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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