Living with risk
Living with risk can lead to anticipatory feelings such as anxiety or hopefulness. Such feelings can a¤ect the choice between lotteries that will be played out in the future - choice may be motivated not only by the (static) risks involved but also by the desire to reduce anxiety or to promote savoring. This paper provides a model of preference in a three-period setting that is axiomatic and includes a role for anticipatory feelings. It is shown that the model of preference can accommodate intuitive patterns of demand for information such as information seeking when a favorable outcome is very likely and information aversion when it is more likely that the outcome will be unfavorable. Behavioral meaning is given to statements such as "individual 1 is anxious" and "2 is more anxious than 1". Finally, the model is di¤erentiated sharply from the classic model due to Kreps and Porteus.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.|
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