IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ris/vhsuwp/2008_082.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Steuerwettbewerb und Finanzverfassung

Author

Listed:
  • Beckmann, Klaus

    () (Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg)

  • Engelmann, Dennis

    (Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg)

Abstract

This paper surveys the nexus between tax competition and the fiscal constitution. We distinguish various approaches to competition between jurisdictions and provide a critique of evolutionary approaches to 'systems competition'. In the main part of the paper, a simple model of horizontal tax competition, based on the Zodrow-Mieszkowski- approach, is developed that can be extended to address 'reasons for rules' in a tax competition context. Specifically, we discuss the internalisation of fiscal externalities in a federation and the timing of tax policy decisions, extending the existing literature in the latter regard. Several tentative constitutional recommendations are derived.

Suggested Citation

  • Beckmann, Klaus & Engelmann, Dennis, 2008. "Steuerwettbewerb und Finanzverfassung," Working Paper 82/2008, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:vhsuwp:2008_082
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.hsu-hh.de/fgvwl/index_YVXLaxcHjq38SfhC.html
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Viktor Vanberg & Wolfgang Kerber, 1994. "Institutional competition among jurisdictions: An evolutionary approach," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 193-219, March.
    2. Gal-Or, Esther, 1985. "First Mover and Second Mover Advantages," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(3), pages 649-653, October.
    3. Wilson, John Douglas & Janeba, Eckhard, 2005. "Decentralization and international tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(7), pages 1211-1229, July.
    4. Richard Layard, 2006. "Happiness and Public Policy: a Challenge to the Profession," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(510), pages 24-33, March.
    5. Kornai, J, 1979. "Resource-Constrained versus Demand-Constrained Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(4), pages 801-819, July.
    6. Joel Slemrod, 2001. "A General Model of the Behavioral Response to Taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 8(2), pages 119-128, March.
    7. Rosanne Altshuler & Timothy J. Goodspeed, 2015. "Follow the Leader? Evidence on European and US Tax Competition," Public Finance Review, , vol. 43(4), pages 485-504, July.
    8. Wolfgang Eggert & Martin Kolmar, 2002. "Residence-Based Capital Taxation in a Small Open Economy: Why Information is Voluntarily Exchanged and Why it is Not," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 9(4), pages 465-482, August.
    9. Alesina, Alberto & Drazen, Allan, 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1170-1188, December.
    10. George Akerlof, 1976. "The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 90(4), pages 599-617.
    11. Beckmann, Klaus, 2003. "Steuerhinterziehung," Beiträge zur Finanzwissenschaft, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, edition 1, volume 18, number urn:isbn:9783161481819.
    12. Wildasin, David E., 1989. "Interjurisdictional capital mobility: Fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 193-212, March.
    13. Sugden, Robert, 1989. "Spontaneous Order," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 85-97, Fall.
    14. Bliss, Christopher & Nalebuff, Barry, 1984. "Dragon-slaying and ballroom dancing: The private supply of a public good," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 1-12, November.
    15. Agnès Bénassy-Quéré & Nicolas Gobalraja & Alain Trannoy, 2005. "Tax Competition and Public Input," Working Papers 2005-08, CEPII research center.
    16. Torsten Schmidt, 2003. "Institutionelle Bedingungen eines Wettbewerbsföderalismus in Deutschland: Transaktionskosten stärker berücksichtigen," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 72(3), pages 458-471.
    17. Janeba, Eckhard, 1997. "International Tax Competition," Beiträge zur Finanzwissenschaft, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, edition 1, volume 1, number urn:isbn:9783161467967.
    18. Kerber, Wolfgang & Eckardt, Martina, 2005. "Policy learning in Europe: The 'open method of coordination' and laboratory federalism," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 48, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ris:vhsuwp:2008_082. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Klaus Bekcmann). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/egbwhde.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.