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Does Fiscal Equalization Lead to Higher Tax Rates? Empirical Evidence from Germany

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  • Krause, Manuela
  • Büttner, Thiess

Abstract

This paper explores the role of fiscal equalization as a driver of states’ tax policy in Germany. We argue that fiscal redistribution of tax revenues provides an incentive for states to increase their tax rates. The analysis exploits differences in the degree of fiscal redistribution among the states over time. The results show a significant effect on tax policy: with full equalization of revenues from the real estate transfer tax the tax rate is about one percentage point higher than without.

Suggested Citation

  • Krause, Manuela & Büttner, Thiess, 2017. "Does Fiscal Equalization Lead to Higher Tax Rates? Empirical Evidence from Germany," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168214, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168214
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    11. Manuela Krause & Niklas Potrafke, 2020. "The Real Estate Transfer Tax and Government Ideology: Evidence from the German States," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 76(1), pages 100-120.
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    Cited by:

    1. Thiess Büttner, 2017. "Welfare Cost of the Real Estate Transfer Tax," CESifo Working Paper Series 6321, CESifo.
    2. Manuela Krause & Niklas Potrafke, 2020. "The Real Estate Transfer Tax and Government Ideology: Evidence from the German States," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 76(1), pages 100-120.
    3. Jens Boysen-Hogrefe & Wolfgang Scherf & Carolin Dresselhaus & Thomas Schäfer & Kunka Petkova & Alfons J. Weichenrieder & Reiner Holznagel & Jens Lemmer & Manuela Krause & Niklas Potrafke & Alfons Weic, 2017. "Stagnating Home-Ownership Rates, Share Deals: How Should Land Transfer Tax Be Reformed?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 70(21), pages 03-24, November.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • R38 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Government Policy

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