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The deductibility of provincial business taxes in a federation with vertical fiscal externalities

Author

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  • Bev Dahlby
  • Jack Mintz
  • Sam Wilson

Abstract

Should provincial business taxes be deductible under a federal profit tax? We show that the ‘optimal deductible,’ which neutralizes the vertical fiscal externality between the federal and provincial government, is the change in the federal tax base per dollar of tax revenue collected by the provincial government. The optimal payroll tax deductibility rate depends on the extent to which it is shifted to workers and on the difference between the federal tax rates on profits and on labour income. Two apparently contradictory positions – full deductibility of a payroll tax and non‐deductibility – are special cases of our model. La déductibilité des taxes provinciales imposées aux entreprises dans une fédération où il y a des externalités fiscales verticales. Est‐ce que les taxes provinciales imposées aux entreprises devraient être déductibles de l'impôt fédéral sur les profits? Les auteurs montrent que l'optimum de déductibilité qui neutralise les externalités fiscales verticales entre le fédéral et les provinces est le changement dans la base d'imposition fédérale par dollar de revenu fiscal collecté par le gouvernement provincial. Le taux de déductibilité optimal d'un impôt sur les salaires dépend de la portion du fardeau fiscal qui est déportée vers les travailleurs et de la différence entre les taux d'imposition du fédéral sur les profits et sur le revenu du travail. Deux positions apparemment contradictoires – pleine déductibilité d'un impôt sur les salaires et déductibilité nulle – sont des cas spéciaux du modèle général.

Suggested Citation

  • Bev Dahlby & Jack Mintz & Sam Wilson, 2000. "The deductibility of provincial business taxes in a federation with vertical fiscal externalities," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 33(3), pages 677-694, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:33:y:2000:i:3:p:677-694
    DOI: 10.1111/0008-4085.00036
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    Cited by:

    1. Willem Sas, 2017. "Can fiscal equalisation mitigate tax competition? Ad valorem and residence-based taxation in a federation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(5), pages 817-853, September.
    2. William Hoyt, 2005. "The Assignment and Division of the Tax Base in a System of Hierarchical Governments," Working Papers 2005-07, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.
    3. von Schwerin, Axel, 2015. "Effective Burden of Business Taxation and Tax Eff ort of Local Governments," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112955, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. Crivelli, Ernesto & Volpe Martincus, Christian, 2007. "Horizontal and Vertical Tax Externalities in a Multicountry World," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 8/2007, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    5. Lisa Grazzini & Alessandro Petretto, 2006. "Vertical Tax Competition with Tax Sharing and Equalization Grants," Giornale degli Economisti, GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University, vol. 65(1), pages 75-94, May.
    6. Christian Kelders & Marko Koethenbuerger, 2010. "Tax incentives in fiscal federalism: an integrated perspective," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 43(2), pages 683-703, May.
    7. Jeffrey D. Petchey & Sofia Levtchenkova, 2003. "Welfare Effects of National Taxes in an Economy with Regions," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 79(245), pages 218-228, June.
    8. William H. Hoyt, 2017. "The assignment and division of the tax base in a system of hierarchical governments," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(4), pages 678-704, August.
    9. Michael Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2003. "Leviathan and Capital Tax Competition in Federations," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(2), pages 177-199, April.
    10. Michael J. Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2002. "Does Federalism Lead to Excessively High Taxes?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 363-370, March.
    11. Robin Boadway & Katherine Cuff, 2017. "The impressive contribution of Canadian economists to fiscal federalism theory and policy," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 50(5), pages 1348-1380, December.
    12. Krause, Manuela & Büttner, Thiess, 2017. "Does Fiscal Equalization Lead to Higher Tax Rates? Empirical Evidence from Germany," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168214, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    13. Lisa Grazzini & Alessandro Petretto, 2012. "Voting on devolution in a federal country with a bicameral national system," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 51-72, March.

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