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Fiscal Incentive Effects of the Australian Equalisation System

Author

Listed:
  • Bev Dahlby
  • Neil Warren

Abstract

Equalisation grants can affect a state's fiscal behaviour because its tax policies can affect the size of its grant. For a large state, an increase in its tax rate will increase the standard tax rate used to calculate the grant for that base and thereby reduce (increase) the state's grant if it has a high (low) relative fiscal capacity with respect to that base. In addition, a state's grant will increase if its relative fiscal capacity declines when it raises its tax rates. Our econometric results indicate that the equalisation system may have affected the Australian states' choice of tax rates. Copyright 2003. The Economic Society of Australia.

Suggested Citation

  • Bev Dahlby & Neil Warren, 2003. "Fiscal Incentive Effects of the Australian Equalisation System," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 79(247), pages 434-445, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecorec:v:79:y:2003:i:247:p:434-445
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hindriks, Jean & Peralta, Susana & Weber, Shlomo, 2008. "Competing in taxes and investment under fiscal equalization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(12), pages 2392-2402, December.
    2. Jean, HINDRIKS & Susana , PERALTA & Sholmo , WEBER, 2005. "Fiscal competition, revenue sharing, and policy-induced agglomeration," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2005062, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
    3. repec:kap:itaxpf:v:24:y:2017:i:5:d:10.1007_s10797-016-9437-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Christos Kotsogiannis & Robert Schwager, 2006. "Fiscal Equalization and Yardstick Competition," Working Papers 2006-15, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.
    5. Buettner, Thiess, 2006. "The incentive effect of fiscal equalization transfers on tax policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(3), pages 477-497, February.
    6. Michael Smart, 2007. "Raising taxes through equalization," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1188-1212, November.
    7. Hansjörg Blöchliger & Claire Charbit, 2008. "Fiscal equalisation," OECD Journal: Economic Studies, OECD Publishing, vol. 2008(1), pages 1-22.
    8. Christian Traxler & Andreas Reutter, 2008. "Apportionment, Fiscal Equalization and Decentralized Tax Enforcement," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_21, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    9. Krause, Manuela & Büttner, Thiess, 2017. "Does Fiscal Equalization Lead to Higher Tax Rates? Empirical Evidence from Germany," Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168214, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    10. Jean Hindriks & Susana Peralta & Shlomo Weber, 2014. "Local Taxation of Global Corporation: A Simple Solution," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 113-114, pages 37-65.
    11. Neil Warren, 2008. "Fiscal Equalisation in Australia: High Level VFI and Equity Focused HFE," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 6(1), pages 10-15, 04.
    12. repec:kap:itaxpf:v:25:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10797-017-9451-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Egger, Peter & Koethenbuerger, Marko & Smart, Michael, 2010. "Do fiscal transfers alleviate business tax competition? Evidence from Germany," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(3-4), pages 235-246, April.
    14. Hansjörg Blöchliger & José Maria Pinero Campos, 2011. "Tax Competition Between Sub-Central Governments," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 872, OECD Publishing.
    15. Claudio Burian Wanderley, 2006. "Transferências Federativas E Potência Dos Contratos: Avaliação Da Lei Robin Hood," Anais do XII Seminário sobre a Economia Mineira [Proceedings of the 12th Seminar on the Economy of Minas Gerais],in: João Antonio de Paula & et alli (ed.), Anais do XII Seminário sobre a Economia Mineira [Proceedings of the 12th Seminar on the Economy of Minas Gerais] Cedeplar, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais.
    16. Köthenbürger, Marko & Egger, Peter & Smart, Michael, 2013. "Do Electoral Rules Make Legislators Differently Responsive to Fiscal Transfers? Evidence from German Municipalities," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79972, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    17. Peter Egger & Marko Koethenbuerger & Michael Smart, 2010. "Electoral rules and incentive effects of fiscal transfers: evidence from Germany," Working Papers 2010/44, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    18. Raghbendra Jha & Woojin Kang & Hari K. Nagarajan, 2011. "Fiscal Decentralization and Local Tax Effort," ASARC Working Papers 2011-01, The Australian National University, Australia South Asia Research Centre.
    19. Petra Ens, 2009. "Tax competition and equalization: the impact of voluntary cooperation on the efficiency goal," Working Papers 2009/16, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    20. Claudio Burian Wanderley, 2007. "Transferências Federativas E Potência Dos Contratos: Avaliação Da Lei Robin Hood," Anais do XXXV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 35th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 012, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    21. Bev Dahlby & Ergete Ferede, 2012. "The effects of tax rate changes on tax bases and the marginal cost of public funds for Canadian provincial governments," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(6), pages 844-883, December.
    22. Caterina Liesegang & Marco Runkel, 2009. "Corporate Income Taxation of Multinationals and Fiscal Equalization," FEMM Working Papers 09028, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    23. Kotsogiannis, Christos & Schwager, Robert, 2008. "Accountability and fiscal equalization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(12), pages 2336-2349, December.
    24. Diego Martínez-López, 2005. "On the states' behavior with equalization grants," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2005/03, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.

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