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Fiscal Incentive Effects of the Australian Equalisation System

Author

Listed:
  • Bev Dahlby
  • Neil Warren

Abstract

Equalisation grants can affect a state's fiscal behaviour because its tax policies can affect the size of its grant. For a large state, an increase in its tax rate will increase the standard tax rate used to calculate the grant for that base and thereby reduce (increase) the state's grant if it has a high (low) relative fiscal capacity with respect to that base. In addition, a state's grant will increase if its relative fiscal capacity declines when it raises its tax rates. Our econometric results indicate that the equalisation system may have affected the Australian states’ choice of tax rates.

Suggested Citation

  • Bev Dahlby & Neil Warren, 2003. "Fiscal Incentive Effects of the Australian Equalisation System," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 79(247), pages 434-445, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecorec:v:79:y:2003:i:247:p:434-445
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4932.2003.00143.x
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    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4932.2003.00143.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sam Bucovetsky & Michael Smart, 2006. "The Efficiency Consequences of Local Revenue Equalization: Tax Competition and Tax Distortions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(1), pages 119-144, January.
    2. Robin W. Boadway & Frank R. Flatters, 1982. "Efficiency and Equalization Payments in a Federal System of Government: A Synthesis and Extension of Recent Results," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 15(4), pages 613-633, November.
    3. Petchey, Jeffrey, 1995. "Resource Rents, Cost Differences and Fiscal Equalization," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 71(215), pages 343-353, December.
    4. Winer, Stanley L. & Hettich, Walter, 1998. "What Is Missed if We Leave Out Collective Choice in the Analysis of Taxation," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 51(2), pages 373-389, June.
    5. Winer, Stanley L. & Hettich, Walter, 1998. "What Is Missed If We Leave Out Collective Choice in the Analysis of Taxation," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 51(n. 2), pages 373-89, June.
    6. Thomas J. Courchene & David A. Beavis, 1973. "Federal-Provincial Tax Equalization: An Evaluation," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 6(4), pages 483-502, November.
    7. Nicolaas Groenewold & Alfred J Hagger & John R Madden, 2002. "The Efficiency of Federal Inter-Regional Transfers Under a Regime of Politically-Maximizing Regional Governments," Economics Discussion / Working Papers 02-03, The University of Western Australia, Department of Economics.
    8. Michael Smart, 1998. "Taxation and Deadweight Loss in a System of Intergovernmental Transfers," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(1), pages 189-206, February.
    9. Jeffrey Petchey, 1995. "Resource Rents, Cost Differences and Fiscal Equalization," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 71(4), pages 343-353, December.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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