Leviathans, Federal Transfers, and the Cartelization Hypothesis
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- Marko Köthenbürger, 2005. "Leviathans, federal transfers, and the cartelization hypothesis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 449-465, March.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Carl Gaigné & Stéphane Riou, 2007.
"Globalization, Asymmetric Tax Competition, and Fiscal Equalization,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory,
Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(5), pages 901-925, October.
- Carl Gaigne & Stéphane Riou, 2007. "Globalization, Asymmetric Tax Competition, and Fiscal Equalization," Post-Print ujm-00176385, HAL.
- Nobuo Akai & Hikaru Ogawa & Yoshitomo Ogawa, 2011.
"Endogenous choice on tax instruments in a tax competition model: unit tax versus ad valorem tax,"
International Tax and Public Finance,
Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 18(5), pages 495-506, October.
- Nobuo Akai & Hikaru Ogawa & Yoshitomo Ogawa, 2010. "Endogenous Choice on Tax Instruments in a Tax Competition Model: Unit Tax versus Ad Valorem Tax," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 10-01, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
- Sharma, Chanchal Kumar, 2007. "Rescuing the concept of vertical fiscal imbalance," MPRA Paper 39343, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2010.
More about this item
KeywordsLeviathan; fiscal transfers; fiscal competition; federalism; constitution;
- H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-08-02 (All new papers)
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