IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Endogenous Choice on Tax Instruments in a Tax Competition Model: Unit Tax versus Ad Valorem Tax

  • Nobuo Akai

    ()

    (Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University)

  • Hikaru Ogawa

    ()

    (School of Economics, Nagoya University)

  • Yoshitomo Ogawa

    ()

    (Faculty of Economics, Kinki University)

This paper analyzes an endogenous choice problem with regard to tax instruments in a capital tax competition model. Considering a symmetric and two-region model of tax competition, where each region is allowed to choose either unit or ad valorem tax, we show that selecting unit tax as a policy instrument is the dominant strategy of governments. An interpretation of this result is clearly explained by the properties of the best response curves.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/1001.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) in its series Discussion Papers in Economics and Business with number 10-01.

as
in new window

Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:osk:wpaper:1001
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/Email:


More information through EDIRC

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:osk:wpaper:1001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Atsuko SUZUKI)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.