Endogenous Choice on Tax Instruments in a Tax Competition Model: Unit Tax versus Ad Valorem Tax
This paper analyzes an endogenous choice problem with regard to tax instruments in a capital tax competition model. Considering a symmetric and two-region model of tax competition, where each region is allowed to choose either unit or ad valorem tax, we show that selecting unit tax as a policy instrument is the dominant strategy of governments. An interpretation of this result is clearly explained by the properties of the best response curves.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/Email: |
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