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Government Debt and Default in a Minimal State

Author

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  • Ludwig, Maximilian

    () (Department of Economics, Hamburg University)

Abstract

I construct a model of a small open economy in which government spending is necessary to mitigate transaction cost. This provides a simple raison d’etre for a government and generates features many sovereign default models do not have: taxes and government spending. Even though the government sector is relatively small, the model can generate average and peak levels of government debt as well as second moments in line with business cycle statistics of Argentina. The model is solved using an algorithm that works roughly similar to earlier works in this literature, but avoids their issues with erroneous approximations.

Suggested Citation

  • Ludwig, Maximilian, 2013. "Government Debt and Default in a Minimal State," Working Papers 30/2013, Universidade Portucalense, Centro de Investigação em Gestão e Economia (CIGE).
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:cigewp:2013_030
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gelos, R. Gaston & Sahay, Ratna & Sandleris, Guido, 2011. "Sovereign borrowing by developing countries: What determines market access?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 243-254.
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    4. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 43-50, March.
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    6. Robert J. Barro & Xavier Sala-I-Martin, 1992. "Public Finance in Models of Economic Growth," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(4), pages 645-661.
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    8. Cole, Harold L. & Kehoe, Patrick J., 1995. "The role of institutions in reputation models of sovereign debt," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 45-64, February.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sovereign Default; Government Spending; Interest Rates;

    JEL classification:

    • F32 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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