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Imperfect Competition in Electricity Markets with Renewable Generation: The Role of Renewable Compensation Policies

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  • Brown, David P.

    (University of Alberta, Department of Economics)

  • Eckert, Andrew

    (University of Alberta, Department of Economics)

Abstract

We analyze the effects of commonly employed renewable compensation policies on firm behavior in an imperfectly competitive market. We consider a model where firms compete for renewable capacity in a procurement auction prior to choosing their forward contract positions and competing in wholesale electricity markets. We focus on fixed and premium-priced feed-in tariff (FIT) compensation policies. We demonstrate that the renewable compensation policy impacts both the types of resources that win the renewable auction and subsequent market competition. While firms have stronger incentives to exercise market power in wholesale markets under a premium-priced FIT, they also have increased incentives to sign pro-competitive forward contracts. Despite these countervailing incentives, in net firms have stronger incentives to exercise market power under the premium-priced policy. We find conditions under which renewable resources that are more correlated with market demand are procured under a premium-priced design, while the opposite occurs under a fixed-priced policy. If the cost efficiencies associated with the "more valuable" renewable resources are sufficiently large, then welfare is larger under the premium-priced policy despite the stronger market power incentives in the wholesale market. Finally, we consider incumbent behavior in the renewable auction when competing against entrants with more valuable resources.

Suggested Citation

  • Brown, David P. & Eckert, Andrew, 2018. "Imperfect Competition in Electricity Markets with Renewable Generation: The Role of Renewable Compensation Policies," Working Papers 2018-12, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:albaec:2018_012
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Electricity; Renewables; Market Power; Regulation; Procurement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy

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