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Imperfect Competition in Electricity Markets with Renewable Generation: The Role of Renewable Compensation Policies

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  • David P. Brown and Andrew Eckert

Abstract

We analyze the effects of commonly employed renewable compensation policies on firm behavior in an imperfectly competitive market. We consider a model where firms compete for renewable capacity in an auction prior to choosing their forward positions and competing in wholesale markets. We focus on fixed and premium-priced feed-in tariff (FIT) compensation policies. We demonstrate that compensation policies impact both the types of resources that win the auction and subsequent competition. While firms have stronger incentives to exercise market power under a premium-priced FIT, they also have increased incentives to sign pro-competitive forward contracts. In net firms have stronger incentives to exercise market power under the premium-priced policy. We find conditions under which renewable resources that are more correlated with market demand are procured under a premium-priced design, while the opposite occurs under a fixed-priced policy. If the cost efficiencies associated with the ýmore valuableý renewable resources are sufficiently large, then welfare is higher under the premium-priced policy despite the stronger market power incentives in the wholesale market.

Suggested Citation

  • David P. Brown and Andrew Eckert, 2020. "Imperfect Competition in Electricity Markets with Renewable Generation: The Role of Renewable Compensation Policies," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 61-88.
    • Handle: RePEc:aen:journl:ej41-4-brown
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    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Zhen & Lam, Jasmine Siu Lee & Huo, Jiazhen, 2024. "The bidding strategy for renewable energy auctions under government subsidies," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 353(PB).
    2. Olivier Bahn, Mario Samano, and Paul Sarkis, 2021. "Market Power and Renewables: The Effects of Ownership Transfers," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4).

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    JEL classification:

    • F0 - International Economics - - General

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