IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/red/sed012/893.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Inflationary Sentiments and Monetary Policy Communcation

Author

Listed:
  • Leonardo Melosi

    (London Business School)

  • Francesco Bianchi

    (Duke University)

Abstract

We develop a DSGE model in which the conduct of monetary policy influences agents' inflationary sentiments, defined as waves of pessimism about how aggressively the central bank will react to inflation in the future. Monetary policy alternates periods of active inflation stabilization (i.e., active regime) and periods during which the emphasis is mainly on output stabilization (i.e., passive regime). Deviations from the active regime can be long or short lasting. When observing passive monetary policy, agents do not know the nature of the deviation and have to learn which type of passive regime is in place. As the central bank deviates from the active monetary policy for a longer and longer period, inflationary sentiments progressively spread among agents, who get increasingly convinced that the central bank might have switched to the long-lasting passive regime. Mounting inflationary sentiments have the effect to make the inflation-output gap trade-off worse and to depress private sector's welfare. When the model is calibrated to U.S. data, we find that inflationary sentiments sluggishly rise as the Federal Reserve deviates from active monetary policy. Such a dynamic for sentiments implies that (i) inflation drifts up for several years in response to a cost-push shock and (ii) the Federal Reserve has a large leeway in accommodating this type of shocks. Increasing the transparency of the Federal Reserve is found to improve welfare by anchoring inflationary sentiments. Gains from transparency are even more sizeable in periods when the persistence of shocks is high and for countries whose central bank has failed establishing a strong commitment to keeping inflation under control.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonardo Melosi & Francesco Bianchi, 2012. "Inflationary Sentiments and Monetary Policy Communcation," 2012 Meeting Papers 893, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  • Handle: RePEc:red:sed012:893
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2012/paper_893.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nimark, Kristoffer, 2008. "Dynamic pricing and imperfect common knowledge," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, pages 365-382.
    2. Troy Davig & Eric M. Leeper, 2007. "Generalizing the Taylor Principle," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 607-635.
    3. Thomas A. Lubik & Frank Schorfheide, 2004. "Testing for Indeterminacy: An Application to U.S. Monetary Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 190-217.
    4. Lawrence J. Christiano & Martin Eichenbaum & Charles L. Evans, 2001. "Nominal rigidities and the dynamic effects of a shock to monetary policy," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    5. Lawrence J. Christiano & Martin Eichenbaum & Charles L. Evans, 2005. "Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Monetary Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(1), pages 1-45, February.
    6. Thomas A. Lubik & Frank Schorfheide, 2004. "Testing for Indeterminacy: An Application to U.S. Monetary Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 190-217.
    7. Christian Matthes & Argia M. Sbordone & Timothy Cogley, 2011. "Optimal Disinflation Under Learning," 2011 Meeting Papers 74, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Farmer, Roger E.A. & Waggoner, Daniel F. & Zha, Tao, 2009. "Understanding Markov-switching rational expectations models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 1849-1867, September.
    9. Frank Schorfheide, 2003. "Learning and monetary policy shifts," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2003-23, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    10. Giorgio E. Primiceri, 2005. "Time Varying Structural Vector Autoregressions and Monetary Policy," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 72(3), pages 821-852.
    11. Christopher A. Sims & Tao Zha, 2005. "Were There Regime Switches in U.S. Monetary Policy?," Working Papers 92, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    12. Kristoffer Nimark, 2007. "Dynamic Pricing and Imperfect Common Knowledge," RBA Research Discussion Papers rdp2007-12, Reserve Bank of Australia.
    13. Leonardo Melosi, 2011. "Public's Inflation Expectations and Monetary Policy," 2011 Meeting Papers 1151, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    14. James D. Hamilton & Daniel F. Waggoner & Tao Zha, 2007. "Normalization in Econometrics," Econometric Reviews, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(2-4), pages 221-252.
    15. Sims, Christopher A, 2002. "Solving Linear Rational Expectations Models," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 20(1-2), pages 1-20, October.
    16. Christopher A. Sims & Tao Zha, 2006. "Were There Regime Switches in U.S. Monetary Policy?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 54-81.
    17. Frank Schorfheide, 2005. "Learning and Monetary Policy Shifts," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 8(2), pages 392-419, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. repec:oup:restud:v:84:y:2017:i:2:p:853-884. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Klodiana Istrefi & Anamaria Piloiu, 2013. "Economic Policy Uncertainty, Trust and Inflation Expectations," CESifo Working Paper Series 4294, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Leonardo Melosi, 2017. "Signalling Effects of Monetary Policy," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(2), pages 853-884.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed012:893. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/sedddea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.