The effectiveness of English secondary schools for pupils of different ability levels
'League table' information on school effectiveness in England generally relies on either a comparison of the average outcomes of pupils by school, e.g. mean exam scores, or on estimates of the average value added by each school. These approaches assume that the information parents and policy-makers need most to judge school effectiveness is the average achievement level or gain in a particular school. Yet schools can be differentially effective for children with differing levels of prior attainment. We present evidence on the extent of differential effectiveness in English secondary schools, and find that even the most conservative estimate suggests that around one quarter of schools in England are differentially effective for students of differing prior ability levels. This affects an even larger proportion of children as larger schools are more likely to be differentially effective.
|Date of creation:||22 Jul 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Quantitative Social Science. UCL IOE, 20 Bedford Way London WC1H 0AL|
Phone: (44) (0)20 7612 6654. Eliminate (44) and add (0) if calling from inside the UK. Add (44) and eliminate (0) if calling from abroad.
Fax: (44) (0)20 7612 6686
Web page: http://www.ioe.ac.uk/research/departments/qss/35445.html
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Esther Duflo & Pascaline Dupas & Michael Kremer, 2008.
"Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya,"
NBER Working Papers
14475, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Esther Duflo & Pascaline Dupas & Michael Kremer, 2011. "Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(5), pages 1739-74, August.
- Duflo, Esther & Dupas, Pascaline & Kremer, Michael, 2008. "Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya," CEPR Discussion Papers 7043, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Joshua D. Angrist & Kevin Lang, 2004.
"Does School Integration Generate Peer Effects? Evidence from Boston's Metco Program,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1613-1634, December.
- Angrist, Joshua & Lang, Kevin, 2004. "Does School Integration Generate Peer Effects? Evidence from Boston's Metco Program," IZA Discussion Papers 976, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- David N. Figlio & Marianne E. Page, 2000.
"School Choice and the Distributional Effects of Ability Tracking: Does Separation Increase Equality?,"
NBER Working Papers
8055, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Figlio, David N. & Page, Marianne E., 2002. "School Choice and the Distributional Effects of Ability Tracking: Does Separation Increase Inequality?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 497-514, May.
- Harvey Goldstein & Simon Burgess & Brendon McConnell, 2007. "Modelling the effect of pupil mobility on school differences in educational achievement," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 170(4), pages 941-954.
- Victor Lavy & M. Daniele Paserman & Analia Schlosser, 2008. "Inside the Black of Box of Ability Peer Effects: Evidence from Variation in the Proportion of Low Achievers in the Classroom," NBER Working Papers 14415, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:qss:dqsswp:1106. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bilal Nasim)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.