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A Note on Socially Insufficient Advertising in Tirole’s Duopoly Model

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  • Creane, Anthony

Abstract

In his textbook Tirole (1988, pp. 291-294) presents a model of advertising with Hotelling duopolists. It has been inferred (e.g., Bagwell, 2007) that in the competitive equilibrium derived, there can be socially too little advertising. It is shown that given the assumptions in Tirole (1988), there cannot be socially too little advertising for this equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Creane, Anthony, 2019. "A Note on Socially Insufficient Advertising in Tirole’s Duopoly Model," MPRA Paper 94572, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:94572
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
    2. Christou, C. & Vettas, N., 2008. "On informative advertising and product differentiation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 92-112, January.
    3. Bagwell, Kyle, 2007. "The Economic Analysis of Advertising," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1701-1844, Elsevier.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    informative advertising; existence; welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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