Monopoly Provision of Tune-ins
This paper analyzes a single television station's choice of airing tune-ins (preview advertisements). I consider two consecutive programs located along a unit line. Potential viewers know the earlier program but are uncertain about the later one. The TV station may air a fully informative tune-in during the first program. The cost of the tune-in is the forgone advertising revenue. Under mild conditions, there exists a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which some viewers watch the first program just to see if there is a tune-in or not, and the TV station airs a tune-in unless the two programs are too dissimilar. In the absence of a tune-in, no viewer within the first-period audience keeps watching TV. Full information disclosure never arises. The market outcome is suboptimal; a social planner would air a tune-in for a wider range of programs.
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