The firm as a common. The case of the accumulation and use of capital resources in co-operative enterprises
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More about this item
Keywordsco-operative enterprises; indivisible reserves; common resources; rivalry; non-excludability; capital accumulation; governance;
- B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary
- J54 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Producer Cooperatives; Labor Managed Firms
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- P12 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Capitalist Enterprises
- P13 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Cooperative Enterprises
- P14 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Property Rights
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2017-02-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-CSE-2017-02-26 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-HME-2017-02-26 (Heterodox Microeconomics)
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