IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/trn/utwpeu/1790.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Firm as a Common. The Case of the Accumulation and Use of Capital Resources in Co-operative Enterprises

Author

Listed:
  • Ermanno Tortia

Abstract

Contemporary literature dealing with the governance of the exploitation of common-pool natural resources was initiated by Elinor Ostrom in 1990, and has been growing fast ever since. On the contrary, within the same research stream, the study of the presence and economic role of common resources in entrepreneurial-organizational is, to date, under-researched. This work endeavours some attempt to fill this gap. Firstly, by spelling out a new-institutionalist framework for the analysis of the accumulation and governance of common capital resources within organizational boundaries. Secondly, by considering co-operative enterprises as the organizational form that, on the basis of historical record, and of behavioural and institutional characteristics, demonstrated to be most compatible with a substantial role for common and non-divided asset-ownership and with its governance thereof. The economic forces influencing the optimal level of self-financed common capital resources in co-operatives are enquired. Also their governance is brought under the spotlight, evidencing: (i) the constraints that need to be fulfilled, and the potential benefits arising out of their presence; (ii) the compatibility and mutual adaptability between democratic governance in co-operatives and the governance of non-divided assets.

Suggested Citation

  • Ermanno Tortia, 2017. "The Firm as a Common. The Case of the Accumulation and Use of Capital Resources in Co-operative Enterprises," Euricse Working Papers 1790, Euricse (European Research Institute on Cooperative and Social Enterprises).
  • Handle: RePEc:trn:utwpeu:1790
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.euricse.eu/publications/the-firm-as-a-common-the-case-of-the-accumulation-and-use-of-capital-resources-in-co-operative-enterprises/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter & Georg Kirchsteiger, 1997. "Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 833-860, July.
    2. Pennington, Mark, 2013. "Elinor Ostrom and the robust political economy of common-pool resources," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(4), pages 449-468, December.
    3. David Ellerman, 2007. "On the Role of Capital in “Capitalist†and in Labor-Managed Firms," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 39(1), pages 5-26, March.
    4. Henry Hansmann, 2013. "All firms are cooperatives – and so are governments," Journal of Entrepreneurial and Organizational Diversity, European Research Institute on Cooperative and Social Enterprises, vol. 2(2), pages 1-10, January.
    5. Pencavel, John & Craig, Ben, 1994. "The Empirical Performance of Orthodox Models of the Firm: Conventional Firms and Worker Cooperatives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 718-744, August.
    6. Cole, Daniel H. & Epstein, Graham & Mcginnis, Michael D., 2014. "Digging deeper into Hardin's pasture: the complex institutional structure of ‘the tragedy of the commons’," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(3), pages 353-369, September.
    7. Anonymous, 2013. "Introduction to the Issue," Journal of Wine Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 129-130, November.
    8. MAREK HUDON & BENJAMIN HUYBRECHTS & Anaïs PÉRILLEUX & Marthe NYSSENS, 2017. "Understanding Cooperative Finance As A New Common," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 88(2), pages 155-177, June.
    9. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, 2002. "Small Business Credit Availability and Relationship Lending: The Importance of Bank Organisational Structure," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(477), pages 32-53, February.
    10. Bruno Jossa & Gaetano Cuomo, 1997. "The Economic Theory of Socialism and the Labour-managed Firm," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1091.
    11. Hansmann, Henry, 1988. "Ownership of the Firm," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 267-304, Fall.
    12. Oliver E. Williamson, 2000. "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(3), pages 595-613, September.
    13. Geoffrey M. Hodgson, 2006. "Economics in the Shadows of Darwin and Marx," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3925.
    14. Matthias Benz, 2005. "Not for the Profit, but for the Satisfaction? – Evidence on Worker Well‐Being in Non‐Profit Firms," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 155-176, May.
    15. Lopes, Helena & Santos, Ana C. & Teles, Nuno, 2009. "The motives for cooperation in work organizations," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(3), pages 315-338, December.
    16. Ellerman, David P., 1986. "Horizon problems and property rights in labor-managed firms," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 62-78, March.
    17. Dow,Gregory K., 2003. "Governing the Firm," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521818537, January.
    18. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1990. "Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 4(3), pages 351-366, September.
    19. Frischmann, Brett M., 2013. "Two enduring lessons from Elinor Ostrom," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(4), pages 387-406, December.
    20. Matthias Benz & Alois Stutzer, "undated". "Do Workers Enjoy Procedural Utility?," IEW - Working Papers 127, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    21. Furubotn, Eirik G, 1976. "The Long-Run Analysis of the Labor-Managed Firm: An Alternative Interpretation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(1), pages 104-123, March.
    22. Hodgson, Geoffrey M., 2013. "Editorial introduction to the Elinor Ostrom memorial issue," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(04), pages 381-385, December.
    23. Ostrom, Elinor, 2007. "Challenges and growth: the development of the interdisciplinary field of institutional analysis," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(3), pages 239-264, December.
    24. Sacchetti, Silvia & Tortia, Ermanno, 2013. "The Silver Lining Of Cooperation," AICCON Working Papers 125-2013, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.
    25. Anonymous, 2013. "Introduction to the Issue," Journal of Wine Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(3), pages 243-243, December.
    26. Lorenzo Sacconi, 2004. "Corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a model of "extended" corporate governance. an explanation based on the economic theories of social contract, reputation and reciprocal conformism," LIUC Papers in Ethics, Law and Economics 142, Cattaneo University (LIUC).
    27. Bonin, John P & Jones, Derek C & Putterman, Louis, 1993. "Theoretical and Empirical Studies of Producer Cooperatives: Will Ever the Twain Meet?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(3), pages 1290-1320, September.
    28. Silvia Sacchetti, 2015. "Inclusive and Exclusive Social Preferences: A Deweyan Framework to Explain Governance Heterogeneity," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 126(3), pages 473-485, February.
    29. Podivinsky, Jan M. & Stewart, Geoff, 2007. "Why is labour-managed firm entry so rare?: An analysis of UK manufacturing data," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 177-192, May.
    30. Will Bartlett & John Cable & Saul Estrin & Derek C. Jones & Stephen C. Smith, 1992. "Labor-Managed Cooperatives and Private Firms in North Central Italy: An Empirical Comparison," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 46(1), pages 103-118, October.
    31. Simon Deakin & Alan Hughes, 1999. "Economic Efficiency and the Proceduralisation of Company Law," Working Papers wp133, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    32. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
    33. Ostrom, Elinor & Basurto, Xavier, 2011. "Crafting analytical tools to study institutional change," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(3), pages 317-343, September.
    34. Bruno Jossa, 2012. "Cooperative Firms as a New Mode of Production," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(3), pages 399-416, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ermanno C. Tortia, 2018. "The Firm as a Common. Non-Divided Ownership, Patrimonial Stability and Longevity of Co-Operative Enterprises," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(4), pages 1-18, March.
    2. Dow,Gregory K., 2019. "The Labor-Managed Firm," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107589650, January.
    3. Tortia, Ermanno, 2014. "L'impresa come bene comune," AICCON Working Papers 131-2013, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.
    4. Ermanno C., Tortia, 2018. "A comparative institutional approach to co-operative self-finance: locked assets, divisible and indivisible reserves," MPRA Paper 89121, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Sacchetti, Silvia & Tortia, Ermanno, 2012. "The internal and external governance of cooperatives: the effective membership and consistency of value," AICCON Working Papers 111-2012, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.
    6. Gaetano Cuomo, 2015. "Imprese cooperative e democrazia economica," STUDI ECONOMICI, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2015(116), pages 5-38.
    7. Marina Albanese & Cecilia Navarra & Ermanno Tortia, 2019. "Equilibrium unemployment as a worker insurance device: wage setting in worker owned enterprises," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 36(3), pages 653-671, October.
    8. Gregory K. DOW, 2018. "The Theory Of The Labor-Managed Firm: Past, Present, And Future," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 89(1), pages 65-86, March.
    9. Cecilia Navarra & Ermanno Tortia, 2014. "Employer Moral Hazard, Wage Rigidity, and Worker Cooperatives: A Theoretical Appraisal," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(3), pages 707-726.
    10. Silvia Sacchetti & Ermanno C. Tortia, 2013. "The Internal and External Governance of Cooperatives: Membership and Consistency of Values," Euricse Working Papers 1362, Euricse (European Research Institute on Cooperative and Social Enterprises).
    11. Albanese, Marina & Navarra, Cecilia & Tortia, Ermanno C., 2015. "Employer moral hazard and wage rigidity. The case of worker owned and investor owned firms," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 227-237.
    12. Franklin Obeng-Odoom, 2016. "The Meaning, Prospects, and Future of the Commons: Revisiting the Legacies of Elinor Ostrom and Henry George," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(2), pages 372-414, March.
    13. Ermanno C. Tortia, 2011. "The firm as a common. The case of accumulation and use of common resources in mutual benefit organizations," Department of Economics Working Papers 1112, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    14. repec:bla:annpce:v:89:y:2018:i:1:p:65-86 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Navarra Cecilia & Tortia Ermanno, 2011. "Employer’s moral hazard and the emergence of worker cooperatives," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201103, University of Turin.
    16. Tortia, Ermanno C., 2021. "Employment protection regimes and dismissal of members in worker cooperatives," MPRA Paper 109214, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Gabriel Burdín, 2016. "Equality Under Threat by the Talented: Evidence from Worker‐Managed Firms," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 126(594), pages 1372-1403, August.
    18. Tortia, Ermanno, 2005. "The accumulation of Capital in Labour-Managed Firms: Divisible Reserves and Bonds," AICCON Working Papers 23-2005, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.
    19. Tortia, Ermanno Celeste, 2019. "Employment protection regimes in worker co-operatives: dismissal of worker members and distributive fairness," MPRA Paper 94536, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Sacchetti, Silvia & Tortia, Ermanno, 2013. "The Silver Lining Of Cooperation," AICCON Working Papers 125-2013, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.
    21. Silvia Sacchetti & Ermanno C. Tortia, 2010. "A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COOPERATIVE FIRMS: Self-defined rules, common resources, motivations, and incentives," Econometica Working Papers wp21, Econometica.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Co-operative enterprises; Indivisible reserves; Common resources; Rivalry; Non-excludability; Capital accumulation; Governance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P13 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Cooperative Enterprises
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
    • P51 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:trn:utwpeu:1790. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Barbara Franchini (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/euricit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.