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Drug Dealing In Bucaramanga: Case Study In A Drug Producing Country

Author

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  • Muñoz-Herrera, Manuel
  • Palacio, Luis Alejandro

Abstract

We present a case study of the market of drug dealing in the context of a drug producing country. A main characteristic of a drug producing country is that illegal drugs are more accessible and have dramatically lower prices in the street market compared to countries that do not produce drugs. We locate our study to the city of Bucaramanga, Colombia; the country with the largest production of cocaine in the world. We make use of two sources of primary information (i) direct interviews to drug dealers, and (ii) media analysis of the local newspaper. Our main finding is that individual dealers exchange drugs, without any incentives to integrate and take control of the distribution in the city. That is, the low prices of drugs reduce profit and deter dealers to fight for monopoly, leading to a decentralized market of multiple uni-personal firms who use no violence.

Suggested Citation

  • Muñoz-Herrera, Manuel & Palacio, Luis Alejandro, 2014. "Drug Dealing In Bucaramanga: Case Study In A Drug Producing Country," MPRA Paper 58523, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:58523
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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