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Does one word fit all? The asymmetric effects of central banks' communication policy

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  • Bennani, Hamza

Abstract

This paper provides an extension of Morris and Shin's (2002) model (Morris, S., Shin, H. S. (2002). Social value of public information. The American Economic Review, 92(5), 1521-1534.). It considers an "interpretation bias" of the public signal sent by central banks such as the ECB or the FED. It is shown that such a bias is detrimental and should be considered when central banks implement their communication policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Bennani, Hamza, 2014. "Does one word fit all? The asymmetric effects of central banks' communication policy," MPRA Paper 57150, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:57150
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/57150/1/MPRA_paper_57150.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Maria Demertzis & Nicola Viegi, 2008. "Inflation Targets as Focal Points," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(1), pages 55-87, March.
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    4. Carlo Rosa, 2009. "Forecasting the Direction of Policy Rate Changes: The Importance of ECB Words," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 38(1-2), pages 39-66, February.
    5. Ullrich, Katrin, 2008. "Inflation expectations of experts and ECB communication," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 93-108, March.
    6. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
    7. Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, 2009. "Explaining Monetary Policy in Press Conferences," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 5(2), pages 42-84, June.
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    9. Romain Baeriswyl & Camille Cornand, 2014. "Reducing Overreaction To Central Banks' Disclosures: Theory And Experiment," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 1087-1126, August.
    10. Itzhak Ben-David & John R. Graham, 2013. "Managerial Miscalibration," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 128(4), pages 1547-1584.
    11. Romain Baeriswyl & Camille Cornand, 2014. "Reducing Overreaction To Central Banks' Disclosures: Theory And Experiment," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 1087-1126, August.
    12. Mauro F Roca, 2010. "Transparency and Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge," IMF Working Papers 10/91, International Monetary Fund.
    13. Bjørn-Roger Wilhelmsen & Andrea Zaghini, 2011. "Monetary policy predictability in the euro area: an international comparison," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(20), pages 2533-2544.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    central bank communication; monetary policy; public information.;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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