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Does one word fit all? The asymmetric effects of central banks' communication policy

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  • Bennani, Hamza

Abstract

This paper provides an extension of Morris and Shin's (2002) model (Morris, S., Shin, H. S. (2002). Social value of public information. The American Economic Review, 92(5), 1521-1534.). It considers an "interpretation bias" of the public signal sent by central banks such as the ECB or the FED. It is shown that such a bias is detrimental and should be considered when central banks implement their communication policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Bennani, Hamza, 2014. "Does one word fit all? The asymmetric effects of central banks' communication policy," MPRA Paper 57150, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:57150
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/57150/1/MPRA_paper_57150.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    central bank communication; monetary policy; public information.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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