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The Effect of Contractual Complexity on Technology Sourcing Agreements

  • Hansen, Zeynep
  • Higgins, Matthew

Most research on strategic alliances ignores the underlying contracts that govern the terms of the relationship. This is problematic since it is how these contracts are structured that determines how firms will benefit from a relationship. We present a novel method to analyze contractual complexity in a multi-dimensional framework in an attempt to link together the contractual complexity and control rights literatures. We find that the stage of development, age and prevalence of the underlying technology most influence complexity. Contractual complexity also influences the allocation of control rights. We also explore the importance of prior relationships on the underlying contract.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 4979.

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Date of creation: 17 Sep 2007
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:4979
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