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Gouvernance contractuelle et cognitive des alliances internationales en R&D

  • Dhikra Chebbi Nekhili

    ()

    (Université de Bourgogne
    Université de Reims Champagne Ardennes Groupe ESC-Troyes)

Notre objectif est d’expliquer le choix des firmes multinationales entre les alliances avec prise de participation et les alliances sans prise de participation pour investir en R&D à l’étranger. Les déterminants du choix peuvent être contractuels ou cognitifs. Nos résultats montrent que les alliances sans prise de participation sont choisies en cas d’une spécificité des actifs et de fréquence moyennes ou faibles des transactions et au cas où les firmes parentes détiennent des capacités en R&D similaires. Nos résultats montrent aussi que les firmes multinationales n’optent pas nécessairement pour les alliances à fort degré d’interdépendance organisationnelle dans un objectif d’exploration des nouvelles ressources. Elles n’optent pas, non plus, pour les alliances sans prise de participation en raison de la complémentarité des ressources détenues avec celles des partenaires.

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Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations in its series Working Papers CREGO with number 1090505.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: May 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1090505
Contact details of provider: Postal: 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France

Order Information: Postal: Angèle Renaud, CREGO, 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France
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  1. Teece, David J., 1992. "Competition, cooperation, and innovation : Organizational arrangements for regimes of rapid technological progress," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-25, June.
  2. Oxley, Joanne E, 1997. "Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances: A Transaction Cost Approach," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(2), pages 387-409, October.
  3. Pisano, Gary P, 1989. "Using Equity Participation to Support Exchange: Evidence from the Biotechnology Industry," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 109-26, Spring.
  4. Joskow, Paul L, 1988. "Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 95-117, Spring.
  5. Chen, Homin & Chen, Tain-Jy, 2003. "Governance structures in strategic alliances: transaction cost versus resource-based perspective," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 1-14, February.
  6. Balakrishnan, Srinivasan & Koza, Mitchell P., 1993. "Information asymmetry, adverse selection and joint-ventures : Theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 99-117, January.
  7. Hansen, Zeynep & Higgins, Matthew, 2007. "The Effect of Contractual Complexity on Technology Sourcing Agreements," MPRA Paper 4979, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. David T. Robinson & Toby E. Stuart, 2007. "Financial Contracting in Biotech Strategic Alliances," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50, pages 559-596.
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