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Gouvernance des activités de R&D à l’étranger par les firmes multinationales:contribution de la théorie fondée sur les ressource

Listed author(s):
  • Dhikra Chebbi Nekhili


    (Université de Bourgogne)

  • Mehdi Nekhili


    (Université de Reims Champagne Ardennes)

  • Frédéric Nlemvo


    (Groupe ESC Troyes)

(VF)L’objectif de cet article est d’expliquer le choix des modes de gouvernance des activités de R&D entreprises par les firmes multinationales à l’étranger. Principalement, trois modes de gouvernance sont identifiés : l’internalisation totale des activités de R&D au sein d’une filiale (créée ou acquise) à l’étranger, les alliances en R&D (avec ou sans prise de participation) et l’externalisation totale de ces activités. Dans la perspective de la théorie fondée sur les ressources, le choix d’un mode par rapport à un autre s’explique par le souhait des firmes multinationales de construire un avantage concurrentiel en comblant l’écart entre les ressources réellement détenues et les ressources qu’elles souhaitent acquérir. A travers une étude quantitative de 67 firmes multinationales européennes et nord-américaines, nous montrons que les licences unilatérales sont utilisées en cas de non-disponibilité des ressources en interne et que les alliances sans prise de participation, par opposition aux alliances avec prise de participation, sont choisies lorsque les connaissances à transférer sont codifiables.(VA)The objective of this paper is to explain the choice of governance modes of foreign R&D activities by multinational firms. Mainly, three governance modes are identified: the complete internalization of R&D activities in a wholly owned subsidiary (created or acquired), the R&D alliances (equity alliances or non-equity alliances) and the complete externalization. According to the Resource Based View (RBV), the choice of a mode over another is due to the desire of multinational firms to build a competitive advantage in bridging the gap between resources actually held and resources that they wish to acquire. Through a study of 67 European and North-American multinational firms, our article shows that the unilateral licensing agreements are used in the case of the lack of internal resources. However, non-equity alliances, conversely to equity alliances, are chosen when the knowledge to be transferred is codified.

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Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations in its series Working Papers CREGO with number 1090502.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: May 2009
Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1090502
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2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France

Order Information: Postal: Angèle Renaud, CREGO, 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France

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  1. Pena, Inaki & Boehlje, Michael & Akridge, Jay T., 2000. "Collaborative Agreements In The Ag-Biotechnology Industry: The Importance Of Transaction Costs And Investment Strategy," Proceedings:Transitions in Agbiotech: Economics of Strategy and Policy, June 24-25, 1999, Washington, D.C. 26028, Regional Research Project NE-165 Private Strategies, Public Policies, and Food System Performance.
  2. repec:dau:papers:123456789/654 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Ashish Arora & Andrea Fosfuri, 2000. "Wholly Owned Subsidiary Versus Technology Licensing in the Worldwide Chemical Industry," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 31(4), pages 555-572, December.
  4. Bruce Kogut & Udo Zander, 1993. "Knowledge of the Firm and the Evolutionary Theory of the Multinational Corporation," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 24(4), pages 625-645, December.
  5. Ingemar Dierickx & Karel Cool, 1989. "Asset Stock Accumulation and the Sustainability of Competitive Advantage: Reply," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 35(12), pages 1514-1514, December.
  6. Bae, Sung C. & Noh, Seungwook, 2001. "Multinational corporations versus domestic corporations: a comparative study of R&D investment activities," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 89-104, February.
  7. David M Reeb & Chuck C Y Kwok & H Young Baek, 1998. "Systematic Risk of the Multinational Corporation," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 29(2), pages 263-279, June.
  8. Ingemar Dierickx & Karel Cool, 1989. "Asset Stock Accumulation and Sustainability of Competitive Advantage," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 35(12), pages 1504-1511, December.
  9. Jean-François Hennart, 1989. "Can the “New Forms of Investment” Substitute for the “Old Forms”? A Transaction Costs Perspective," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 20(2), pages 211-234, June.
  10. Pehrsson, Anders, 2008. "Strategy antecedents of modes of entry into foreign markets," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 132-140, February.
  11. Bessy, Christian & Brousseau, Eric, 1998. "Technology licensing contracts features and diversity1," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 451-489, December.
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