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Transact taxes in a price maker/taker market


  • Rosenthal, Dale W.R.
  • Thomas, Nordia Diana Marie


We develop a price maker/taker model to study how a financial transaction tax affects markets. We find taxes widen quoted and effective spreads by more than twice the tax. Taxes increase volatility slightly (without intermediation) to significantly (with intermediation). High taxes may halve volumes and gains from trade while doubling search costs. Measures of market quality are more affected by taxes in markets with intermediaries. Investors and intermediaries competing for liquidity can triple search costs and increase quoted spreads while decreasing effective spreads. We also find revenue-optimal rates of 60-75 bp. Our results are particularly relevant to markets with high-frequency trading or thin depth.

Suggested Citation

  • Rosenthal, Dale W.R. & Thomas, Nordia Diana Marie, 2012. "Transact taxes in a price maker/taker market," MPRA Paper 40556, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:40556

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Cipriani, Marco & Guarino, Antonio, 2008. "Transaction costs and informational cascades in financial markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(3-4), pages 581-592, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Guarino & Andreas Uthemann & Marco Cipriani, 2015. "Financial Transaction Taxes anf the Informational Efficiency of Financial Markets: A Structural Estimation," 2015 Meeting Papers 1165, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    More about this item


    transaction tax; Tobin tax; market microstructure; limit order model; high-frequency trading; search costs;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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