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On involuntary unemployment: notes on efficiency-wage competition

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  • Guerrazzi, Marco

Abstract

This paper introduces a model of efficiency-wage competition along the lines put forward by Hahn (1987). Specifically, I analyse a two-firm economy in which employers screen their workforce by means of increasing wage offers competing one another for high-quality employees. The main results are the following. First, using a specification of effort such that the problem of firms is concave, optimal wage offers are strategic complements. Second, a symmetric Nash equilibrium can be locally stable under the assumption that firms adjust their wage offers in the direction of increasing profits by conjecturing that any wage offer above (below) equilibrium will lead competitors to underbid (overbid) such an offer. Finally, the exploration of possible labour market equilibria reveals that effort is counter-cyclical.

Suggested Citation

  • Guerrazzi, Marco, 2012. "On involuntary unemployment: notes on efficiency-wage competition," MPRA Paper 38140, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:38140
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38140/1/MPRA_paper_38140.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas & Aaron Tornell, 2000. "Exchange Rate Dynamics, Learning and Misperception," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0795, Econometric Society.
    2. Alexopoulos, Michelle, 2004. "Unemployment and the business cycle," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 277-298, March.
    3. Akerlof, George A, 1984. "Gift Exchange and Efficiency-Wage Theory: Four Views," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 79-83, May.
    4. George A. Akerlof, 1982. "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 97(4), pages 543-569.
    5. Mohamed Jellal & Francois-Charles Wolff, 2003. "Dual Labor Markets And Strategic Efficiency Wage," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(3), pages 99-112.
    6. Faria, Joao Ricardo, 2000. "Supervision and effort in an intertemporal efficiency wage model: the role of the Solow condition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 93-98, April.
    7. Solow, Robert M., 1979. "Another possible source of wage stickiness," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 79-82.
    8. Sandholm, William H., 2005. "Excess payoff dynamics and other well-behaved evolutionary dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 124(2), pages 149-170, October.
    9. Uhlig, H.F.H.V.S. & Xu, Y., 1996. "Effort and the Cycle : Cyclical Implications of Efficiency Wages," Discussion Paper 1996-49, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    10. van de Klundert, T.C.M.J., 1988. "Wage differentials and employment in a two-sector model with a dual labour market," Research Memorandum FEW 314, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    11. Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J., 1987. "Efficiency wages versus insiders and outsiders," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-2), pages 407-416.
    12. M Guerrazzi, 2008. "A Dynamic Efficiency-Wage Model with Continuous Effort and Externalities," Economic Issues Journal Articles, Economic Issues, vol. 13(2), pages 37-58, September.
    13. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Guerrazzi, Marco, 2012. "Asymptotic relations in Cournot's game," MPRA Paper 42761, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Efficiency-Wages; Wage Competition; Nash Equilibria; Effort;

    JEL classification:

    • E12 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Keynes; Keynesian; Post-Keynesian
    • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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