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A Dynamic Efficiency-Wage Model with Continuous Effort and Externalities


  • M Guerrazzi


This paper provides a general equilibrium efficiency-wage model in which employment evolves according to the rules of the Shapiro-Stiglitz?s (1984) shirking model. The proposed framework allows us to endogenise in a continuous manner the effort decision undertaken by the individual worker and it may resolve the indeterminacy arising from a model with exogenous (and constant) effort. Moreover, by exploiting an externality argument, we allow the model to capture different local dynamic patterns in which are found convergent fluctuations and persistent cycles. Finally, we show that in our framework unemployment may actually act as a worker discipline device, i.e., equilibria with higher (lower) unemployment rates are also characterised by higher (lower) effort levels.

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  • M Guerrazzi, 2008. "A Dynamic Efficiency-Wage Model with Continuous Effort and Externalities," Economic Issues Journal Articles, Economic Issues, vol. 13(2), pages 37-58, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eis:articl:208guerrazzi

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Pisauro, Giuseppe, 1991. "The effect of taxes on labour in efficiency wage models," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 329-345, December.
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    11. Uhlig, H.F.H.V.S. & Xu, Y., 1996. "Effort and the Cycle : Cyclical Implications of Efficiency Wages," Discussion Paper 1996-49, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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    13. Danthine, Jean-Pierre & Donaldson, John B., 1990. "Efficiency wages and the business cycle puzzle," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(7), pages 1275-1301, November.
    14. Cramton, Peter C & Tracy, Joseph S, 1992. "Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 100-121, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Guerrazzi, Marco, 2017. "Efficiency-wage competition: What happens as the number of players increases?," MPRA Paper 77950, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Guerrazzi, Marco, 2012. "The animal spirits hypothesis and the Benhabib–Farmer condition for indeterminacy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 1489-1497.
    3. Guerrazzi, Marco, 2012. "On involuntary unemployment: notes on efficiency-wage competition," MPRA Paper 38140, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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