Do reticent managers lie during firm surveys?
Previous studies have shown that reticent managers, who are identified through a series of random-response questions, answer questions about corruption, firm performance and how honest they are differently from other managers. If reticent managers’ answers are different because they are lying, estimates of these behaviors will be inaccurate. But it is also possible that reticent managers answer questions differently because they and their firms are different. This paper presents evidence consistent with the idea that reticent managers lie. First, it shows that reticent managers in Nigeria report that their firms pay higher wages than other firms. This is consistent with previous studies that have found that they also report better performance. Second, it shows that workers at firms with reticent managers report lower, or similar, wages to workers at other firms. The different responses of the managers and the workers suggest that reticent managers are lying. That is, reticent managers in Nigeria report paying higher wages but they are not doing so.
|Date of creation:||25 Mar 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jacob A. Mincer, 1974. "Introduction to "Schooling, Experience, and Earnings"," NBER Chapters, in: Schooling, Experience, and Earnings, pages 1-4 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jacob A. Mincer, 1974. "Schooling, Experience, and Earnings," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number minc74-1.
- Omar Azfar & Peter Murrell, 2005.
"Identifying Reticent Respondents: Assessing the Quality of Survey Data on Corruption and Values,"
Electronic Working Papers
05-001, University of Maryland, Department of Economics.
- Omar Azfar & Peter Murrell, 2009. "Identifying Reticent Respondents: Assessing the Quality of Survey Data on Corruption and Values," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(2), pages 387-411, 01.
- Dean Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, 2008. "Lying About Borrowing," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(2-3), pages 510-521, 04-05.
- Gerty J. L. M. Lensvelt-Mulders & Joop J. Hox & Peter G. M. van der Heijden & Cora J. M. Maas, 2005. "Meta-Analysis of Randomized Response Research," Sociological Methods & Research, , vol. 33(3), pages 319-348, February.
- Karlan, Dean S. & Zinman, Jonathan, 2012.
"List randomization for sensitive behavior: An application for measuring use of loan proceeds,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 71-75.
- Dean Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, 2011. "List Randomization for Sensitive Behavior: An Application for Measuring Use of Loan Proceeds," NBER Working Papers 17475, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Clarke, George, 2011. "Lying about firm performance: Evidence from a survey in Nigeria," MPRA Paper 35382, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Clausen, Bianca & Kraay, Aart & Murrell, Peter, 2010.
"Does respondent reticence affect the results of corruption surveys ? evidence from the world bank enterprise survey for Nigeria,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
5415, The World Bank.
- Bianca Clausen & Aart Kraay & Peter Murrell, 2011. "Does Respondent Reticence Affect the Results of Corruption Surveys? Evidence from the World Bank Enterprise Survey for Nigeria," Chapters, in: International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Volume Two, chapter 15 Edward Elgar Publishing.
- George R.G. Clarke & James Habyarimana & Michael Ingram & David Kaplan & Vijaya Ramachandran, 2007. "An Assessment of the Investment Climate in South Africa," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 6738.
- Moulton, Brent R., 1986. "Random group effects and the precision of regression estimates," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 385-397, August.
- Jensen, Nathan M & Rahman, Aminur, 2011. "The silence of corruption : identifying underreporting of business corruption through randomized response techniques," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5696, The World Bank.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:37634. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.