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Cooperating firms in inventive and absorptive research

Author

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  • Ben Youssef, Slim
  • Breton, Michèle
  • Zaccour, Georges

Abstract

We consider a duopoly competing in quantity, where firms can invest in both innovative and absorptive R&D to reduce their unit production cost, and where they benefit from free R&D spillovers between them. We analyze the case where firms act non cooperatively and the case where they cooperate by forming a research joint venture. We show that, in both modes of play, there exists a unique symmetric solution. We find that the investment in innovative R&D is always higher than in absorptive R&D. We also find that the value of the learning parameter has almost no impact on innovative R&D, firms profits, consumer's surplus and social welfare. Finally, differences in investment in absorptive research and social welfare under the two regimes are in opposite directions according to the importance of the free spillover.

Suggested Citation

  • Ben Youssef, Slim & Breton, Michèle & Zaccour, Georges, 2011. "Cooperating firms in inventive and absorptive research," MPRA Paper 35326, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:35326
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Innovative R&D; Absorptive R&D; Learning Parameter; Spillover; Research Joint Venture;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

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