R&D Spillovers and Endogenous Absorptive Capacity
This paper derives a three-stage Cournot duopoly game for research cooperation, research expenditures, and product-market competition. The amount of knowledge firms can absorb is made dependent on their own research efforts, e.g., firms' absorptive capacity is treated as an endogenous variable. It is shown that cooperating firms invest more in R&D than noncooperating firms if spillovers are sufficiently large. The degree of market competition is a key determinant of the effects of research cooperation on research efforts, implying that existing models, which usually assume perfect competition, might be too restrictive.
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Volume (Year): 158 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Amir, Rabah, 2000.
"Modelling imperfectly appropriable R&D via spillovers,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 18(7), pages 1013-1032, October.
- Rabah Amir, 1998. "Modelling Imperfectly Appropriable R&D via Spillovers," CIE Discussion Papers 1998-07, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
- James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1983. "Strategic Commitment with R&D: The Symmetric Case," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 225-235, Spring.
- Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1982. "Strategic Commitment with R&D: The Symmetric Case," Working Papers 516, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Bernard Beaudreau, 1996. "R&D: To Compete or to Cooperate?," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(3), pages 173-186. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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