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The Reality and Masquerade behind Bargaining over Welfare Pie Sizing, Delivery and Slicing

Author

Listed:
  • Mullat, Joseph E.

Abstract

The present analysis addresses the apparently critical issue of circulation of wealth in society. Three actors play the game of welfare-related taxation. The first actor, in the role of Negotiator No.1, stands up for citizens’ legal and moral rights to primary needs. The second actor, in the role of Negotiator No.2, proceeds in response to public will for the provision and delivery of public goods. Quite the opposite, the third actor, hereinafter named the Voter, who represents the taxpayers, prefers personal consumption to moral understanding and public activity. In fact, backed by electoral maneuvering, the Voter emanates a risk to break down negotiations. The result of the simulation provides an evidence for the claim that a 50% median income is close enough to be considered a realistic choice of poverty line within the variety or rules of the alternating-offers bargaining game and conditions for unanimous consent of voter-citizens.

Suggested Citation

  • Mullat, Joseph E., 2010. "The Reality and Masquerade behind Bargaining over Welfare Pie Sizing, Delivery and Slicing," MPRA Paper 24932, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:24932
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24932/1/MPRA_paper_24932.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Atkinson, A B, 1987. "On the Measurement of Poverty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 749-764, July.
    2. Berliant, Marcus & Page, Frank Jr., 1996. "Incentives and income taxation: the implementation of individual revenue requirement functions," Ricerche Economiche, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 389-400, December.
    3. Udo Ebert, 2009. "Taking empirical studies seriously: the principle of concentration and the measurement of welfare and inequality," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(4), pages 555-574, May.
    4. Cardona, Daniel & Ponsati, Clara, 2007. "Bargaining one-dimensional social choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 627-651, November.
    5. Reiner Eichenberger & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, 1998. "Rational moralists: The role of fairness in democratic economic politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 191-210, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    bargaining; policy; public goods; simulation; taxation; voting;

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies

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