The Reality and Masquerade behind Bargaining over Welfare Pie Sizing, Delivery and Slicing
The present analysis addresses the apparently critical issue of circulation of wealth in society. Three actors play the game of welfare-related taxation. The first actor, in the role of Negotiator No.1, stands up for citizens’ legal and moral rights to primary needs. The second actor, in the role of Negotiator No.2, proceeds in response to public will for the provision and delivery of public goods. Quite the opposite, the third actor, hereinafter named the Voter, who represents the taxpayers, prefers personal consumption to moral understanding and public activity. In fact, backed by electoral maneuvering, the Voter emanates a risk to break down negotiations. The result of the simulation provides an evidence for the claim that a 50% median income is close enough to be considered a realistic choice of poverty line within the variety or rules of the alternating-offers bargaining game and conditions for unanimous consent of voter-citizens.
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