IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Emerging Challenges in Indian Banking

  • Bhide, M G
  • Prasad, A
  • Ghosh, Saibal

The paper examines the process of banking sector reforms in India. It notes the beneficial impact to the financial system consequent upon the reforms and highlights the current weaknesses in the banking system. Against this background, the paper identifies the emerging challenges and discusses ways in which they could be tackled. In order to evaluate the efficacy of the prudential norms, we conduct a stress test of credit risk. Our analysis reveals that, depending on the percentage of loans that graduate into non-performance and the provisioning made, the immediate hit is a loss of interest income between Rs.21-55 billion. The maximum level of additional provisioning that can support the present capital adequacy ratio is determined.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 1711.

in new window

Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:1711
Contact details of provider: Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June.
  2. Tolga Ediz & Ian Michael & William Perraudin, 1998. "The impact of capital requirements on U.K. bank behaviour," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Oct, pages 15-22.
  3. Franklin R. Edwards & Frederic S. Mishkin, 1995. "The decline of traditional banking: implications for financial stability and regulatory policy," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Jul, pages 27-45.
  4. Ghosh, Saibal & Saggar, Mridul, 1998. "Narrow Banking: Theory, evidence and prospects in India," MPRA Paper 17352, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Sarkar, Jayati & Sarkar, Subrata & Bhaumik, Sumon K., 1998. "Does Ownership Always Matter?--Evidence from the Indian Banking Industry," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 262-281, June.
  6. Cordella, Tito & Levy Yeyati, Eduardo, 1998. "Public Disclosure and Bank Failures," CEPR Discussion Papers 1886, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2000. "The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1441-1478.
  8. Reinhart, Carmen & Goldstein, Morris & Kaminsky, Graciela, 2000. "Assessing financial vulnerability, an early warning system for emerging markets: Introduction," MPRA Paper 13629, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. P. Honohan, 2000. "Banking System Failures in Developing and Transition Countries: Diagnosis and Prediction," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 29(1), pages 83-109, 02.
  10. Steven Riess Weisbrod & Liliana Rojas-Suárez, 1994. "Financial Market Fragilities in Latin America: From Banking Crisis Resolution to Current Policy Challenges," IMF Working Papers 94/117, International Monetary Fund.
  11. Dr Donald Brash, 1997. "Banking soundness and the role of the market," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 60, March.
  12. Hyytinen, Ari & Takalo, Tuomas, 2000. "Enhancing Bank Transparency: A Re-assessment," Research Discussion Papers 10/2000, Bank of Finland.
  13. Demetriades, Panicos O & Luintel, Kul B, 1996. "Financial Development, Economic Growth and Banker Sector Controls: Evidence from India," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(435), pages 359-74, March.
  14. Kevin C. Murdock & Thomas F. Hellmann & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2000. "Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 147-165, March.
  15. Gerard Caprio & Patrick Honohan, 1999. "Restoring Banking Stability: Beyond Supervised Capital Requirements," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 43-64, Fall.
  16. Diamond, Douglas W, 1991. "Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 689-721, August.
  17. Dirk Schoenmaker, 1992. "Institutional Separation between Supervisory and Monetary Agencies," FMG Special Papers sp52, Financial Markets Group.
  18. McKinnon, Ronald I, 1989. "Financial Liberalization and Economic Development: A Reassessment of Interest-Rate Policies in Asia and Latin America," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(4), pages 29-54, Winter.
  19. Goodhart, Charles & Schoenmaker, Dirk, 1995. "Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 539-60, October.
  20. Caprio, Gerard Jr. & Klingebiel, Daniela, 1996. "Bank insolvencies : cross-country experience," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1620, The World Bank.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:1711. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.