To Work or Not? Simulating Inspection Game with Labor Unions
The model of social network is used to analyze the impact of the power of labor unions in the labor relations. We find that labor union capable to affect a pecuniary compensation of shirking employees lessens the motivation of employees to work and improve to the unionization rate. As a result, the performance of the firm is significantly deteriorated and its existence endangered. On the other hand, the inspection proved to be a successful method for “motivating” employees to work. By using non-omniscient agents, we also estimated the cost of that non-omniscience, which proved to be significant in all cases.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2009|
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