IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/5129.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Psychological Bias as a Driver of Financial Regulation

Author

Listed:
  • Hirshleifer, David

Abstract

I propose here the psychological attraction theory of financial regulation—that regulation is the result of psychological biases on the part of political participants—voters, politicians, bureaucrats, and media commentators; and of regulatory ideologies that exploit these biases. Some key elements of the psychological attraction approach are: salience and vividness, omission bias, scapegoating and xenophobia, fairness and reciprocity norms, overconfidence, and mood effects. This approach further emphasizes emergent effects that arise from the interactions of individuals with psychological biases. For example, availability cascades and ideological replicators have powerful effects on regulatory outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Hirshleifer, David, 2007. "Psychological Bias as a Driver of Financial Regulation," MPRA Paper 5129, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:5129
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5129/1/MPRA_paper_5129.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kroszner, Randall S & Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1163-1187, December.
    2. Ivo Welch & Siew Hong Teoh & T.J. Wong, 1995. "Earnings Management and The Post-Issue Underperformance in Seasoned Equity Offerings," Finance 9-95., University of California at Los Angeles.
    3. Summers, L.H. & Summers, V.P., 1989. "When Financial Markets Work Too Well : A Cautious Case For A Securities Transactions Tax," Papers t12, Columbia - Center for Futures Markets.
    4. Craig S. Hakkio, 1994. "Should we throw sand in the gears of financial markets?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q II, pages 17-30.
    5. Efraim Benmelech & Tobias J. Moskowitz, 2010. "The Political Economy of Financial Regulation: Evidence from U.S. State Usury Laws in the 19th Century," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(3), pages 1029-1073, June.
    6. Huberman, Gur, 2001. "Familiarity Breeds Investment," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 14(3), pages 659-680.
    7. Hoffman, Elizabeth & McCabe, Kevin A & Smith, Vernon L, 1996. "On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 25(3), pages 289-301.
    8. Daniel, Kent & Hirshleifer, David & Teoh, Siew Hong, 2002. "Investor psychology in capital markets: evidence and policy implications," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 139-209, January.
    9. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1971. "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 561-574, September.
    10. Abhijit V. Banerjee, 1992. "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 107(3), pages 797-817.
    11. Massimo Massa & Andrei Simonov, 2006. "Hedging, Familiarity and Portfolio Choice," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 19(2), pages 633-685.
    12. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, 2003. "Libertarian paternalism is not an oxymoron," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 48(Jun).
    13. Richard H. McAdams & Eric B. Rasmusen, 2004. "Norms in Law and Economics," Working Papers 2004-11, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    14. Degeorge, Francois & Patel, Jayendu & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1999. "Earnings Management to Exceed Thresholds," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 72(1), pages 1-33, January.
    15. Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 263-291, March.
    16. Trueman, Brett, 1986. "The Relationship between the Level of Capital Expenditures and Firm Value," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(02), pages 115-129, June.
    17. Daniel Kahneman, 2003. "Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1449-1475, December.
    18. Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "Persuasion in Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 435-439, May.
    19. Stiglitz, J.E., 1989. "Using Tax Policy To Curb Speculative Short-Term Trading," Papers t2, Columbia - Center for Futures Markets.
    20. Terrance Odean, 1999. "Do Investors Trade Too Much?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1279-1298, December.
    21. Caplan, Bryan, 2001. "Rational Ignorance versus Rational Irrationality," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(1), pages 3-26.
    22. Roberta Romano, 2004. "The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2653, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Jul 2005.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Henke, Hans-Martin, 2016. "The effect of social screening on bond mutual fund performance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 69-84.
    2. Gérard Charreaux, 2009. "Droit et gouvernance:l’apport du courant comportemental," Working Papers CREGO 1091001, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    3. Agarwal, Sumit & Amromin, Gene & Ben-David, Itzhak & Chomsisengphet, Souphala & Evanoff, Douglas D., 2008. "The Effects of Mandated Financial Counseling on Household Mortgage Decisions: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Working Paper Series 2008-20, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
    4. Lucia A. Reisch & Andreas Oehler, 2009. "Behavioral Economics: eine neue Grundlage für die Verbraucherpolitik?," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 78(3), pages 30-43.
    5. Degen, Kathrin & Fleisch, Elgar & Götte, Lorenz & Lalive, Rafael & Staake, Thorsten & Tasic, Vojkan & Tiefenbeck, Verena, 2016. "Overcoming Salience Bias: How Real-Time Feedback Fosters Resource Conservation," CEPR Discussion Papers 11480, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Hirshleifer, David & Teoh, Siew Hong, 2009. "The Psychological Attraction Approach to Accounting and Disclosure Policy," MPRA Paper 14046, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Federico Favaretto & Donato Masciandaro, 2014. "Behavioral Economics and Monetary Policy," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1501, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    8. Nofsinger, John R., 2012. "Household behavior and boom/bust cycles," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 161-173.
    9. Beattie, Vivien & Fearnley, Stella & Hines, Tony, 2010. "Factors Affecting Audit Quality in the 2007 UK Regulatory Environment: Perceptions of Chief Financial Officers, Audit Committee Chairs and Audit Engagement Partners," SIRE Discussion Papers 2012-29, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    10. Tasic Slavisa, 2011. "Are Regulators Rational?," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 1-21, April.
    11. Gehring, Kai, 2012. "Benefit or burden? Unraveling the effect of economic freedom on subjective well-being," Working Papers 0531, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    12. Hirshleifer, David & Teoh, Siew Hong, 2008. "Thought and Behavior Contagion in Capital Markets," MPRA Paper 9164, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Francesc Trillas Jané, 2016. "Behavioral Regulatory Agencies," Working Papers wpdea1606, Department of Applied Economics at Universitat Autonoma of Barcelona.
    14. Nofsinger, John & Varma, Abhishek, 2014. "Socially responsible funds and market crises," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 180-193.
    15. Gehring, Kai, 2014. "Who Benefits from Economic Freedom? Unraveling the Effect of Economic Freedom on Subjective Well-Being," Working Papers 531, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    16. David Hirshleife, 2015. "Behavioral Finance," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 7(1), pages 133-159, December.
    17. Itzhak Ben-David & Sumit Agarwal & Gene Amromin & Souphala Chomsisengphet & Douglas D. Evanoff, 2011. "Does Mandatory Loan Review Affect Mortgage Contract Choice and Performance?," NFI Working Papers 2011-WP-12, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Investor psychology; regulation; salience; omission bias; scapegoating; xenophobia; fairness; reciprocity; norms; mood; availability cascades; overconfidence; evolutionary psychology; memes; ideology; replicators;

    JEL classification:

    • G0 - Financial Economics - - General
    • H0 - Public Economics - - General
    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:5129. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.