Efficiency of skill training for acquiring sector-specific skills with search frictions
This paper develops a simple search model in which sector-specific trainings are endogenously determined with or without a negotiation between a worker and an employer, and characterizes the allocation of two types of training. If a worker and an employer can negotiate over the amount of skill training, the training hours to acquire a skill specific to this employer's sector may be longer or shorter in the decentralized allocation than in the socially efficient allocation. Meanwhile, if they cannot negotiate, the training hours are definitely longer in the decentralized allocation than in the socially efficient allocation.
|Date of creation:||May 2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/e_HP/e_g_shiryo.html|
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