IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Deceptive Redistribution

Listed author(s):
  • Simeon Alder

    ()

    (Department of Economics, University of Notre Dame)

  • Guillermo Ordonez

    (University of Pennsylvania and NBER)

Many policies enhance welfare under certain conditions, but have the potential to generate private rents at other times. This can prompt rent-seeking governments to adopt such policies excessively. If the economy's constituents can easily detect opportunistic policymaking, rent-seeking is constrained by the prospect of loosing political reputation and the removal from power. If, in contrast, information is scarce and the politician's motives are accordingly murky, his discretion depends critically on the ability of different constituents to report instances of abuse. Governments, however, can mitigate scrutiny by way of excessive transfers that benefit prospective political clients. The patterns of inefficiency and redistribution that our model generates match salient stylized facts. In contrast to the standard view that inefficiencies are unavoidable when implementing redistributive policies, we argue that redistribution may be a means to disguise inefficient policies that generate private benefits to politicians.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www3.nd.edu/~tjohns20/RePEc/deendus/wpaper/017_redistribution.pdf
File Function: First version, 2012
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University of Notre Dame, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 017.

as
in new window

Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: May 2012
Date of revision: Oct 2012
Handle: RePEc:nod:wpaper:017
Contact details of provider: Postal:
434 Flanner Hall, Notre Dame, IN 46556

Phone: (574) 631-7698
Web page: http://economics.nd.edu
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window

  1. James D. Fearon, 2011. "Self-Enforcing Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 126(4), pages 1661-1708.
  2. Manacorda, Marco & Miguel, Edward & Vigorito, Andrea, 2009. "Government Transfers and Political Support," CEPR Discussion Papers 7163, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. James M. Snyder & David Strömberg, 2010. "Press Coverage and Political Accountability," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(2), pages 355-408, 04.
  4. Segura-Ubiergo,Alex, 2012. "The Political Economy of the Welfare State in Latin America," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107410664, December.
  5. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1998. "Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 139-156, March.
  6. Ray, Debraj, 2007. "A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199207954.
  7. Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, "undated". ""An Economic Model of Representative Democracy''," CARESS Working Papres 95-02, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
  8. Besley, Timothy J. & Prat, Andrea, 2002. "Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability," CEPR Discussion Papers 3132, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Pricila Maziero & Pierre Yared & Laurence Ales, 2011. "Imperfect Information and Political Economy," 2011 Meeting Papers 101, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  10. Pierre Yared, 2010. "Politicians, Taxes and Debt," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 77(2), pages 806-840.
  11. Lee J. Alston & Gary D. Libecap & Bernardo Mueller, 2010. "Interest Groups, Information Manipulation in the Media, and Public Policy: The Case of the Landless Peasants Movement in Brazil," NBER Working Papers 15865, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December.
  13. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nod:wpaper:017. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Terence Johnson)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.