Bank Size, Reputation, and Debt Renegotiation
This paper examines the effect that the coexistence of small and large banks, with different interests in the international market, has on the debt renegotiation process. Making use of a reputational model, we argue that the presence of small banks implies that debtor countries have a harder tine obtaining new money than what they would have absent the small banks.
|Date of creation:||Sep 1988|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as International Economic Review, February, 1992.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
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