Debt Concentration and Secondary Markets Prices: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis
In the context of a model that distinguishes between large money center banks and smaller regional banks, we show that the percentage of a country's debt held by the large banks affects the secondary market price of that country's debt: the higher the concentration of the debt, the higher the secondary market price. We also show that the free trade of debt in the secondary market does not necessarily imply that the entire stock of debt will eventually be owned by the large banks. Our empirical analysis incorporates a number of potential determinants of secondary market prices. Among these are variables that are associated with a country's economic performance, variables that can be associated with the regulatory structure in the creditor's country, and the concentration of debt in the hands of the largest US banks. Our empirical findings indicate that concentration indeed has a positive effect on secondary market prices.
|Date of creation:||Mar 1991|
|Publication status:||published as International Economic Review, Vol. 40 (1999): 333-355.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
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