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A game theoretical approach to the international debt overhang

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  • Mamoru Kaneko
  • Jacek Prokop

Abstract

This paper considers an international financial problem of a sovereign country called debt overhang. The term "debt overhang" expresses the situation where a sovereign country has borrowed money from foreign banks and has been unable to fulfill the scheduled repayments for some period. We formulate this problem as a noncooperative game with n lender banks as players where each decides either to sell its loan exposure to the debtor country at the present price of debt on the secondary market, or to wait and keep its exposure. There are many pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria in this game. However we show that in any Nash equilibrium, the resulting secondary market price remains almost the same as the present price when the number of banks is large. We also obtain the comparative statics result that in a mixed strategy equilibrium, banks with smaller loan exposures have a greater tendency to sell than banks with larger loan exposure. In addition, we discuss the structure of the set of Nash equilibria.
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  • Mamoru Kaneko & Jacek Prokop, 1993. "A game theoretical approach to the international debt overhang," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 1-24, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:58:y:1993:i:1:p:1-24
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01234799
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    1. Jeffrey Sachs & Harry Huizinga, 1987. "U.S. Commercial Banks and the Developing-Country Debt Crisis," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 18(2), pages 555-606.
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    5. Prokop, Jacek, 1992. "Duration of debt overhang with two lender banks," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 473-478, April.
    6. Jacek Prokop, 1998. "Dynamics of International Debt Overhang with Two Lender Banks," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 49(2), pages 119-137, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Prokop, Jacek, 2012. "Bargaining over debt rescheduling," MPRA Paper 44315, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Eaton, Jonathan & Fernandez, Raquel, 1995. "Sovereign debt," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 3, pages 2031-2077, Elsevier.
    3. Pim Heijnen, 2009. "On the probability of breakdown in participation games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(3), pages 493-511, March.
    4. Jacek Prokop, 1998. "Dynamics of International Debt Overhang with Two Lender Banks," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 49(2), pages 119-137, June.
    5. Prokop, Jacek, 1992. "Duration of debt overhang with two lender banks," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 473-478, April.
    6. Prokop, Jacek, 1995. "Organized debt buybacks: No cure for free riding?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 481-496, August.
    7. Prokop, Jacek & Baranowska-Prokop, Ewa, 2012. "The Efficiency of Foreign Borrowing: The Case of Poland," MPRA Paper 44976, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. David Nickerson & Asha Sadanand & Venkatraman Sadanand, 1994. "Strategic delay and endogenous offers in bargaining games with private information," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 60(2), pages 125-154, June.

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