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Improving Last-Mile Service Delivery using Phone-Based Monitoring

Author

Listed:
  • Karthik Muralidharan
  • Paul Niehaus
  • Sandip Sukhtankar
  • Jeffrey Weaver

Abstract

Improving “last-mile” public-service delivery is a recurring challenge in developing countries. Could the widespread adoption of mobile phones provide a scalable, cost-effective means for improvement? We use a large-scale experiment to evaluate the impact of phone-based monitoring on a program that transferred nearly a billion dollars to 5.7 million Indian farmers. In randomly-selected jurisdictions, officials were informed that program implementation would be measured via calls with beneficiaries. This led to a 7.6% reduction in the number of farmers who did not receive their transfers. The program was highly cost-effective, costing 3.6 cents for each additional dollar delivered.

Suggested Citation

  • Karthik Muralidharan & Paul Niehaus & Sandip Sukhtankar & Jeffrey Weaver, 2018. "Improving Last-Mile Service Delivery using Phone-Based Monitoring," NBER Working Papers 25298, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25298
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes

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