Quotas and the Stability of Implicit Collusion
This paper shows that the imposition of an import quota by one country can lead to increased competitiveness; protection can reduce the price in the country that imposes the quota, the foreign country, or both. This emerges from a model in which the firms are assumed to sustain collusion by the threat of reversion to more competitive pricing. We consider both prices and quantities as the strategic variables and study competition both in the domestic and the foreign market taken individually, and in the two markets taken together.
|Date of creation:||Jun 1986|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as "Tariffs Vs. Quotas with Implicit Collusion," Canadian Journal of Economics , Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 237-244, May 1989.|
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- Davidson, Carl, 1984. "Cartel stability and tariff policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3-4), pages 219-237, November.
- Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January.
- Dixit, Avinash K & Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "The Use of Protection and Subsidies for Entry Promotion and Deterrence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 139-52, March.
- James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1980.
"Tariffs and the Extraction of Foreign Monopoly Rents under Potential Entry,"
414, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1981. "Tariffs and the Extraction of Foreign Monopoly Rents under Potential Entry," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 14(3), pages 371-89, August.
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